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The Consequences of 
Consequentialist Criteria 
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos* 
The two most significant approaches to redistricting to emerge in the 
last generation are both consequentialist. That is, they both urge 
authorities to design—and courts to evaluate—district plans on the basis 
of the plans’ likely electoral consequences. According to the partisan 
fairness approach, plans should treat the major parties symmetrically in 
terms of the conversion of votes to seats. According to the competitiveness 
approach, districts should be as electorally competitive as is feasible. 
Unnoticed by the literature, a substantial number of jurisdictions, in 
both America and Australia, have heeded these calls from the academy. In 
sum, consequentialist criteria have been used to shape the district plans for 
close to three hundred elections over the last four decades. In this Article, I 
provide an initial assessment of the record of these criteria. The record, for 
the most part, is mediocre. Controlling for other relevant factors, partisan 
fairness requirements have not made district plans more symmetric in their 
treatment of the major parties. Nor have competitiveness requirements 
made elections more competitive. The likely explanations are the poor 
drafting, low prioritization, and need for unrealistically accurate electoral 
forecasts of most consequentialist criteria. 
However, other common proposals for redistricting reform—in 
particular, the use of neutral institutions such as commissions—have 
performed much better. Elections in Australia, all of which rely on 
commissions, are much fairer and more competitive than their American 
counterparts. In the United States, commission usage increases both 
partisan fairness in state legislative elections and competitiveness in 
congressional elections, even controlling for an array of other variables. 
Ironically, it seems that consequentialist criteria cannot achieve their own 
desired consequences—but that non-consequentialist approaches can. 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful to Christopher 
Elmendorf, William Hubbard, Michael McDonald, Eric McGhee, and David Schleicher for their 
helpful comments. My thanks also to the workshop participants at the George Washington University 
Law School, Melbourne Law School, and Griffith Law School, where I presented earlier versions of 
the Article. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The two most significant approaches to redistricting to emerge in the last 
generation are both consequentialist. That is, they both urge authorities to design—
and courts to evaluate—district plans on the basis of the plans’ likely electoral 
consequences. The partisan fairness approach, associated primarily with political 
scientists such as Bernard Grofman and Gary King, argues that plans should treat 
the major political parties symmetrically. Each party should be equally able to 
convert its support from voters into legislative seats. Deviations from symmetry 
should be avoided by line drawers and relied on by courts to invalidate biased 
plans. 
The competitiveness approach, linked to law professors such as Samuel 
Issacharoff and Richard Pildes, contends that districts should be as electorally 
competitive as is feasible. Competition is the lifeblood of democracy because it 
makes representatives accountable to voters and results in a legislature that is 
responsive to changes in the electorate’s sentiments. It should therefore be 
prioritized over all other considerations when the time comes to reshape districts. 
It should also be invoked by courts to strike down especially uncompetitive plans. 
Almost unnoticed by the literature, a number of jurisdictions, both in 
America and abroad, have heeded these calls from the academy and adopted 
consequentialist redistricting criteria. With respect to partisan fairness, South 
Australia enacted a law in 1991 requiring districts to be drawn so that if a party 
wins a majority of the popular vote, it will also win a majority of seats in the 
legislature. Delaware and Hawaii have longstanding provisions barring district 
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plans that “unduly favor” a party.1 And legislatures, commissions, and courts in 
thirteen other U.S. states have taken partisan fairness into account on at least one 
occasion since 1966. 
With respect to competitiveness, laws in Arizona, Washington, and 
Wisconsin include (or formerly included) it as a mandatory line-drawing criterion. 
Legislatures, commissions, and courts in six other U.S. states also have sought 
voluntarily to craft competitive districts at least once in the modern redistricting 
era. In total, partisan fairness and competitiveness have been used to design the 
district plans for close to three hundred South Australian, congressional, and state 
legislative elections over the last four decades. This is a far larger universe of cases 
than has previously been realized.  
In this Article, I investigate the consequences of these consequentialist 
criteria. I investigate, in other words, whether plans enacted pursuant to a partisan 
fairness requirement actually treat the major parties more symmetrically, and 
whether plans enacted pursuant to a competitiveness criterion in fact result in 
more competitive elections. To carry out this investigation, I compiled the results 
of all federal and state elections held in Australia since 1990, as well as South 
Australian state election results since 1950. I also compiled all American 
congressional and state legislative election results since 1966, when the one-
person, one-vote rule was first implemented nationwide. 
Once I assembled this data, I calculated several measures of partisan fairness 
and competitiveness for each jurisdiction in each election year. My measures of 
partisan fairness were (1) partisan bias, i.e., the divergence in the share of seats that 
each party would win given the same share of the statewide vote; and (2) the 
efficiency differential, i.e., the gap between the parties’ respective “wasted” votes. My 
measures of competitiveness were (1) average margin of victory, i.e., the average 
difference in vote shares between the winning and losing candidates; (2) share of 
competitive seats, i.e., the proportion of races decided by less than a twenty-point 
margin; and (3) electoral responsiveness, i.e., the rate at which a party gains or loses 
seats given changes in its overall vote share. All of these metrics are widely used by 
political scientists. 
At first glance, my results seem promising for advocates of consequentialist 
criteria. South Australia has enjoyed lower levels of partisan bias and smaller 
efficiency differentials than other Australian states since adopting its partisan 
fairness rule in 1991. So too have U.S. states that have employed similar 
requirements, in both congressional and state legislative elections. In terms of 
competitiveness as well, average margins of victory are smaller, shares of 
competitive seats are larger, and rates of electoral responsiveness are higher in U.S. 
 
1. See HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 6(2); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 804(4) (2002); see also HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 25-2(b)(1) (2012). 
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states that explicitly have tried to draw competitive districts. These effects are 
particularly pronounced at the state legislative level. 
Unfortunately, many of these results become less impressive when the data is 
subjected to more sophisticated analysis. For example, South Australia’s partisan 
bias levels and efficiency differentials are not lower than those that it featured prior 
to adopting its partisan fairness requirement. Nor does South Australia’s current 
advantage over its fellow states remain statistically significant when controls are 
added for factors such as the year, the level of election, and the number of 
districts. Similarly, statistical significance disappears in most (though not all) U.S. 
models when controls are added for the redistricting institution, other line-
drawing criteria, whether the state government was unified or divided, and other 
relevant variables. One exception is that partisan fairness requirements continue to 
reduce the efficiency differential in congressional elections. A more important 
exception is that competitiveness criteria continue to decrease the average margin 
of victory and increase the share of competitive seats and the level of electoral 
responsiveness in state legislative elections. 
What are we to make of this picture? The most obvious lesson is that 
consequentialist criteria have not, to date, delivered their promised consequences, 
at least not in their promised magnitude. Levels of partisan fairness and 
competitiveness simply have not risen very much even when jurisdictions have 
enacted requirements specifically aimed at raising them. This may be because the 
provisions were drafted poorly—for instance, what does it mean to “unduly 
favor” a party?2 Or it may be because the provisions were not prioritized very 
highly, but rather were considered only after several other criteria were applied 
first. Or, most discouragingly, it may be because redistricting authorities are largely 
incapable of predicting future election results. Consequentialist criteria may not 
work because electoral consequences cannot be forecasted accurately enough. 
A second implication is that, to the extent that consequentialist criteria do 
work, they do so most clearly in the case of competitiveness requirements applied 
to state legislative elections. This is the one domain in which the use of 
consequentialist criteria remained significant even after adding the full panoply of 
controls. It is possible that competitiveness is easier for line drawers to predict 
than partisan fairness. The various measures of competitiveness are simpler to 
compute than their partisan fairness counterparts, and they are linked as well to 
foreseeable factors such as the presence of incumbents. It is also possible that 
state legislative elections are a more favorable setting for consequentialist criteria 
than congressional elections. Their lower stakes may make district drafters more 
willing to pursue goals other than partisan or bipartisan advantage. And their 
larger numbers of districts may provide drafters with more cartographic flexibility 
 
2. See sources cited supra note 1. 
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while also improving the accuracy of the various metrics (which are more volatile 
when the number of districts is small). 
A final point is that common proposals for redistricting reform other than the 
adoption of consequentialist criteria seem to work quite well. South Australia’s 
partisan bias levels and efficiency differentials did not drop when it adopted its 
partisan fairness requirement, but they plummeted after it instituted an 
independent commission in 1975. Australian elections as a whole, all of which rely 
on commissions, are much more symmetric in their treatment of the major parties, 
and much more competitive, than their American analogues. In the United States, 
commission usage increases partisan fairness in state legislative elections and 
boosts competitiveness in congressional elections, even controlling for an array of 
other factors. The use of familiar line-drawing criteria such as respect for political 
subdivisions also has a strong pro-competitive effect at both the state legislative 
and congressional levels. Accordingly, the relative ineffectiveness of 
consequentialist criteria is no cause for despair. Less exotic reform options can 
achieve many of the same consequentialist goals, while also realizing a number of 
other desirable values. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I introduces the partisan fairness and 
competitiveness approaches and discusses their normative foundations. Part II, 
the Article’s analytical core, examines empirically the consequences of 
consequentialist criteria. Finally, Part III explores some of the legal and policy 
implications of the previous section’s findings. 
I. CONSEQUENTIALIST CRITERIA IN THEORY 
Two approaches to redistricting have dominated the academic debate over 
the last generation: the partisan fairness approach, advocating that district plans 
treat the major parties symmetrically, and the competitiveness approach, advising 
that districts be made as competitive as is feasible.3 Both of these approaches are 
consequentialist because they urge that districts be drawn on the basis of their 
likely electoral consequences. In this Part, I summarize the two approaches, 
present the normative theories that underlie them, and set forth some of their 
respective strengths and weaknesses. 
A. Partisan Fairness 
The partisan fairness approach, which is “virtually a consensus position of 
the [political science] community,”4 asserts that district plans should not vary in 
 
3. See Adam B. Cox, Partisan Gerrymandering and Disaggregated Redistricting, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 
409, 419–27 (presenting as two “conventional accounts” of redistricting the “partisan bias account” 
and the “anticompetition account”). 
4. Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan 
Gerrymandering After LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2, 6 (2007); see also Andrew Gelman & Gary 
King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 541, 554 (1994) (“The 
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their treatment of the major parties. Each party should be equally able to convert 
its support among the electorate into seats in the legislature. If one party receives a 
certain share of seats for a certain share of the vote, then the other party should 
receive the same seat share for this vote share. Importantly, partisan fairness is not 
the same thing as proportional representation. It is perfectly permissible for one 
party to receive, say, 65% of seats for 55% of the vote, as long as the other party 
also would receive 65% of seats were it to muster 55% of the vote.5 
A particular kind of equality principle motivates the partisan fairness 
approach. It is a principle that applies to political parties, not to other organized 
groups or individuals. It is also a principle whose touchstone is the conversion of 
statewide votes to statewide seats, not ballot access or financial resources or 
efficacy in campaigning. Parties are the key entities that are understood to be 
affected by redistricting, and vote-to-seat conversion is the key concept that is 
understood to be at issue. As Grofman and King put it, the “idea is that 
candidates of each political party should have equal opportunity in translating 
voter support into the division of legislative seats between the parties.”6  
Although its reasoning is notoriously difficult to grasp, the Supreme Court 
decision that first recognized a cause of action for gerrymandering, Davis v. 
Bandemer,7 relied in part on this partisan equality principle. The claim whose 
validity the Court acknowledged was that “each political group in a State should 
have the same chance to elect representatives of its choice as any other political 
group.”8 Partisan fairness played almost no role in the Court’s 2004 
gerrymandering decision, Vieth v. Jubelirer,9 but it resurfaced in the 2006 case of 
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry.10 In his opinion for the 
Court, Justice Kennedy declined to endorse the partisan fairness approach, but he 
did note “its utility in redistricting planning and litigation.”11 Other Justices were 
not so circumspect. Justice Stevens observed that the approach is “widely 
accepted by scholars,”12 praised it as a “helpful (though certainly not talismanic) 
tool,”13 and analyzed Texas’s district plan in terms of the symmetry of its 
treatment of the major parties.14 Similarly, Justice Souter cited the “utility of a 
 
vast majority of American political scientists have adopted the normative position that healthy 
representative democracies have low levels of partisan bias . . . .”). 
5. See Grofman & King, supra note 4, at 8. 
6. Id. 
7. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 123–24 (1986). 
8. Id. at 124.  
9. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
10. League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 419–23 (2006). 
11. Id. at 420. 
12. Id. at 466 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
13. Id. at 468 n.9. 
14. See id. at 467. 
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criterion of symmetry as a test” and remarked that “[i]nterest in exploring this 
notion is evident.”15 
The appeal of the partisan fairness approach is that it captures the primary 
harm that is caused by gerrymandering. A district plan is typically considered a 
gerrymander in favor of a party precisely because the plan enables the party to 
convert votes to seats more efficiently than its opponent. A party is typically 
deemed the victim of gerrymandering precisely because its popular support does 
not translate into legislative strength with the same ease as its adversary’s. The 
partisan fairness approach is also attractive because it focuses on a jurisdiction as a 
whole, not on the shape or composition of individual districts. There are many 
innocent explanations for districts’ appearance and makeup, so it is preferable to 
concentrate on the overall rather than the local picture. The approach’s final 
advantage is that it lends itself easily to quantification. As I discuss in Part II, 
metrics such as partisan bias and the efficiency differential reveal how fair or 
unfair a plan is to the major parties. 
On the other hand, a problem with the partisan fairness approach is that 
unequal treatment of the parties is often the result of a jurisdiction’s underlying 
political geography, not a deliberate attempt to gerrymander. For example, if 
Democrats tend to live in urban areas that are overwhelmingly Democratic, while 
Republicans live mostly in suburbs and exurbs that are more evenly divided, then 
any plan that respects subdivision boundaries will be biased in a Republican 
direction.16 Unequal partisan effect is not a sure sign of illicit partisan intent. Another 
issue with the approach is that it overlooks all of the values implicated by 
redistricting other than the treatment of the parties in terms of vote-to-seat 
conversion. To name a few, voter participation, minority influence, and the quality 
of representation all are influenced by how districts are drawn, but all are paid no 
heed by the approach. A final, more technical concern is that the usual metrics of 
partisan fairness are somewhat unreliable. Partisan bias and efficiency differential 
scores fluctuate from election to election, especially when a jurisdiction has few 
districts, and the former measure relies upon the problematic assumption of 
uniform partisan swing.17 
 
15. Id. at 483 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
16. See Jonathan Rodden, The Geographic Distribution of Political Preferences, 13 ANN. REV. POL. 
SCI. 321, 332 (2010) (noting that redistricting biases against leftist parties have existed in many 
countries “going back to the turn of the century”); Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Using Legislative 
Districting Simulations to Measure Electoral Bias in Legislatures 24 (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.stanford 
.edu/~jrodden/wp/Chen%20and%20Rodden%20-%20Midwest%20paper.pdf (finding that district 
plans of most U.S. states containing major cities are biased in the Republican direction). 
17. The uniform swing assumption stipulates that parties’ district-specific vote shares change (or 
“swing”) by the same margin as their statewide vote shares. For example, if the Democrats received 
45% of the vote in a state, and a researcher wanted to know how many seats they would have won if 
they had received 50%, the researcher would simply add 5% to the actual Democratic vote share in 
each district. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1903, 1963–64 
(2012). The assumption usually generates accurate seat share estimates, but is still considered “neither 
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Despite these difficulties, at least sixteen jurisdictions—South Australia and 
fifteen U.S. states—have used partisan fairness as a criterion to design the district 
plans for at least 193 elections. Whether the criterion has actually achieved its aim 
of making plans more symmetric in their treatment of the major parties has never 
previously been investigated.18 It is to this important question that I turn in Part 
II. 
B. Competitiveness 
The other consequentialist approach to redistricting to emerge in recent 
years prizes competitiveness rather than partisan fairness. It contends that districts 
in a jurisdiction should be drawn so that they are as competitive as is reasonably 
possible. Not all districts should be made competitive, because some geographic 
regions are highly uncompetitive and their integrity usually should be respected.19 
But what is clearly unacceptable is the deliberate suppression of the competition 
that would arise in a jurisdiction if district lines were drawn pursuant to 
conventional redistricting criteria. As Issacharoff writes, “The question is . . . 
whether districts may be rigged so as to diminish or eliminate competition that 
would otherwise emerge from redistricting not controlled by incumbent partisan 
power.”20 
The normative reason to prioritize competitiveness so highly is that it 
promotes the realization of several important democratic values. First, individual 
politicians are more accountable to voters when districts are competitive. Closer 
races make it easier for voters to oust politicians from office when they 
disapprove of their record.21 Second, competitiveness increases the responsiveness 
 
theoretically nor empirically satisfying” by certain political scientists. Simon Jackman, Measuring 
Electoral Bias: Australia, 1949–93, 24 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 319, 335 (1994). 
18. To be more precise, this issue has never been investigated with respect to American 
jurisdictions. Jenni Newton-Farrelly has written an illuminating series of articles on the South 
Australian case, finding that the state’s partisan fairness requirement has generally performed well. See 
Jenni Newton-Farrelly, From Gerry-Built to Purpose-Built: Drawing Electoral Boundaries for Unbiased Election 
Outcomes, 45 REPRESENTATION 471, 479–80 (2009) [hereinafter Newton-Farrelly, Gerry-Built]; Jenni 
Newton-Farrelly, From Blindfolds to Naked Emperors: Swing and Fair Electoral Boundaries, SWINBURNE 
RES. BANK (Sept. 27, 2010), http://researchbank.swinburne.edu.au/vital/access/manager/ 
Repository/swin:19065 [hereinafter Newton-Farrelly, Blindfolds]; Jenni Newton-Farrelly, Wrong Winner 
Election Outcomes in South Australia: Bias, Minor Parties and Non-Uniform Swings, SWINBURNE RES. BANK 
2–3 (2010), http://researchbank.swinburne.edu.au/vital/access/manager/Repository/swin:17518 
[hereinafter Newton-Farrelly, Wrong Winner]. 
19. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of Political 
Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 574 (2004) (“Nor is our claim that an electoral system requires 
every district to be competitive. There will always be Berkeley and Orange County . . . .”); Richard H. 
Pildes, The Constitution and Political Competition, 30 NOVA L. REV. 253, 261 (2006) (“To ensure that all 
elections are competitive is, of course, impossible.”). 
20. Samuel Issacharoff, Surreply, Why Elections?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 684, 692 (2002). 
21. See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 616 
(2002) (“[A]ccountability is a central feature of democratic legitimacy . . . .”); Michael P. McDonald & 
John Samples, The Marketplace of Democracy: Normative and Empirical Issues, in THE MARKETPLACE OF 
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of the electoral system as a whole. Shifts in the electorate’s views have a greater 
impact on the composition of the legislature when more districts are competitive 
(and thus can swing from one party to another).22 Lastly, competitiveness is linked 
to voter participation. Voters learn more about candidates and are more likely to 
turn out at the polls when there is some uncertainty about races’ outcomes.23 
Unlike the partisan fairness approach, the competitiveness approach has 
never been endorsed by the Supreme Court. In Vieth, Justice Souter did refer to 
the “analogy to antitrust,” a domain in which anticompetitive practices are 
prohibited, as “an intriguing one that may prove fruitful.”24 However, he then 
added that he did “not embrace [the analogy] at this point out of caution about a 
wholesale conceptual transfer from economics to politics.”25 Similarly, Justice 
Stevens observed in LULAC that uncompetitive races can lead to lower voter 
turnout and higher legislative polarization.26 But his opinion focused on partisan 
intent rather than lack of competition, and he did not suggest that a plan could be 
invalidated for the latter reason.27 And in the 1973 decision of Gaffney v. Cummings, 
the Court actually approved a Connecticut plan that created 130 safe state house 
districts and only 20 competitive districts.28 The Court was untroubled by the 
plan’s reduction of competition in order to produce a “proportionate number of 
Democratic and Republican legislative seats.”29 
The appeal of the competitiveness approach stems from the democratic 
values that it aims to realize. Accountability, responsiveness, and participation all 
are widely seen as key elements of a vibrant democracy—and all are improved by 
increases in district-level competitiveness.30 The approach is also attractive 
because it captures another harm that is sometimes thought to be caused by 
gerrymandering: the creation of safe districts that insulate politicians (particularly 
 
DEMOCRACY: ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 1,5 (Michael P. McDonald & 
John Samples eds., 2006) (“[D]emocratic theorists value electoral competition as a way to ensure that 
representatives are accountable to voters.”). 
22. See Gelman & King, supra note 4, at 544 (“Scholars of American politics almost uniformly 
take the normative position that higher values of responsiveness indicate a healthier democracy.”); 
Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 643, 646 (1998) (“Only through an appropriately competitive partisan environment can 
. . . policy outcomes of the political process be responsive to the interests and views of citizens.”). 
23. See Pildes, supra note 19, at 260 (“[ I]t is well documented that competitive elections 
. . . increase voter turnout . . . .”). 
24. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 350 n.5 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting) (plurality opinion). 
25. Id. 
26. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 471 n.10 (2006) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
27. See id. at 456–62. 
28. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 738 n.4 (1973). 
29. Id. at 738; see also Issacharoff, supra note 21, at 612–17 (criticizing Gaffney on this basis). 
30. See Nathaniel Persily, The Place of Competition in American Election Law, in THE 
MARKETPLACE OF DEMOCRACY: ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 
21, at 171, 173 (“[P]olitical competition is primarily a means to other ends: namely, greater 
accountability, responsiveness . . . and participation in government.”). 
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incumbents) from any real risk of losing their seats. This is not the primary harm 
that is associated with gerrymandering (that would be partisan unfairness), but it is 
an important consideration nonetheless.31 The approach’s final advantage is that it 
too lends itself to quantification. Metrics such as average margin of victory, share 
of competitive seats, and electoral responsiveness indicate both how competitive 
individual districts are and how responsive a jurisdiction’s electoral system is as a 
whole. 
Conversely, a problem with the competitiveness approach is that it ignores 
the concept—the unequal treatment of the parties in terms of vote-to-seat 
conversion—that lies at the heart of the usual definition of gerrymandering.32 
That certain districts are uncompetitive, or that a plan in its entirety is 
nonresponsive, is certainly very interesting, but it is not typically thought to be 
evidence that a gerrymander has been enacted. Another issue with the approach is 
that competitiveness is not in fact an unalloyed good. Closer races result in more 
dissatisfied voters who would have preferred a different outcome,33 and very high 
responsiveness means that small changes in voter sentiment produce very large 
changes in legislative composition.34 Finally, like the partisan fairness approach, 
the competitiveness approach neglects values such as minority influence and the 
quality of representation, and its quantitative metrics are relatively volatile.35 
These difficulties have not stopped a substantial number of jurisdictions—
nine U.S. states in 103 elections—from using competitiveness as a criterion to 
design their district plans. Whether the criterion has actually accomplished its goal 
of making elections more competitive is a question that only recently has begun to 
be considered. One study found that Arizona’s adoption of a competitiveness 
criterion in 2000 did not make its elections any more competitive.36 Another study 
determined that “political” requirements, including both competitiveness criteria 
and rules on incumbent protection, reduced the vote shares received by 
incumbents nationwide.37 No work to date has examined the consequences of only 
 
31. See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 471 n.10 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(discussing the ways in which “[s]afe seats may harm the democratic process”). 
32. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 271 n.1 (plurality opinion) (“The term ‘political 
gerrymander’ has been defined as ‘[t]he practice of dividing a geographical area into electoral districts 
. . . to give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the opposition’s voting strength.’”). 
33. See Thomas L. Brunell, Rethinking Redistricting: How Drawing Uncompetitive Districts Eliminates 
Gerrymanders, Enhances Representation, and Improves Attitudes Toward Congress, 39 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 77, 
77–81 (2006) (arguing against competitive districts for this reason). 
34. See Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence 
to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 668 (2002) (noting that if there are too 
many competitive districts in a jurisdiction, then “the slightest shift in voter preferences would lead to 
a landslide victory for one of the parties”). 
35. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
36. See Barbara Norrander & Jay Wendland, Redistricting in Arizona, in REAPPORTIONMENT 
AND REDISTRICTING IN THE WEST 177, 191 (Gary F. Moncrief ed., 2011). 
37. See Richard Forgette & Glenn Platt, Redistricting Principles and Incumbency Protection in the U.S. 
Congress, 24 POL. GEOGRAPHY 934, 939–46 (2005); see also Richard Forgette et al., Do Redistricting 
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competitiveness criteria in all of the jurisdictions that have employed them. The 
next Part offers precisely such an examination. 
II. CONSEQUENTIALIST CRITERIA IN PRACTICE 
Now that the two consequentialist approaches to redistricting have been 
introduced, it is possible to turn to the question that motivates this Article: What 
are the actual consequences of consequentialist criteria? Do they in fact achieve 
their aims of greater partisan fairness and increased competitiveness? I begin this 
Part by explaining my methodology, and I then present the results of my analysis 
with respect to both partisan fairness (for South Australia, the U.S. House of 
Representatives, and American state legislatures) and competitiveness (for the U.S. 
House and state legislatures). In a nutshell, my principal finding is that 
consequentialist criteria have not been very successful at bringing about their 
intended consequences, though there is plenty more to the story. 
A. Methodology 
To begin with, I compiled the results of all federal and state elections held in 
Australia since 1990, as well as South Australian state election results since 1950.38 
South Australia adopted its partisan fairness requirement in 1991,39 so there was 
little reason to gather comprehensive data from prior to this date. I also compiled 
all American congressional and state legislative election results since 1966,40 the 
 
Principles and Practices Affect U.S. State Legislative Electoral Competition?, 9 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 151, 155 
(2009) [hereinafter, Forgette et al., Do Principles?] (referring to states that use competitiveness criteria 
but only actually considering states with incumbency protection rules in analysis); Richard Forgette et 
al., The Un-Principled Politics of State Legislative and Congressional Redistricting 7 (Sept. 2–5, 2005) 
(unpublished paper) (on file with the UC Irvine Law Review) [hereinafter Forgette et al., Un-Principled 
Politics] (same); cf. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Our Electoral Exceptionalism, 80 U. CHI. L. REV.  
800–01 (2013) (summarizing inconclusive literature on implications of redistricting institutions for 
competitiveness). 
38. Federal election results are available at Download Official Election Statistics, AUSTRALIAN 
ELECTORAL COMMISSION, http://www.aec.gov.au/Elections/Federal_Elections/Stats_CDRom.htm 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2013). Recent state election results are available at Election Archive, ABC NEWS, 
http://www.abc.net.au/elections/archive (last visited Jan. 25, 2013). Jenni Newton-Farrelly shared 
with me historical South Australian election results compiled by Colin Hughes, and I am very grateful 
for her help. I only analyzed Australia’s five largest states (New South Wales, Queensland, South 
Australia, Victoria, and Western Australia), and I only used Western Australia’s 2008 state election 
because prior to this date it did not abide by the one-person, one-vote rule. 
39. See S. AUSTL. STATE ELECTORAL OFFICE, SOUTH AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL BOUNDARY 
REDISTRIBUTIONS: 1851–2003, at 4, 7 (2006). 
40. Congressional election results are available at Election Information: Election Statistics, OFF. 
CLERK U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/ 
index.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2013), and also, in a more usable format, in a database that Gary 
Jacobson shared with me. Jacobson’s database contains presidential election results aggregated by 
congressional district as well. I conducted all of my congressional analysis using this data too, but my 
findings were not as easily interpretable. Not surprisingly, variables pertaining to congressional races 
predict congressional results more accurately than aggregated presidential results. For state legislative 
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year the one-person, one-vote rule was first enforced in almost all elections.41 The 
first consequentialist criteria were not implemented until 1972, but the climax of 
the reapportionment revolution seemed like a better starting point for my study 
than the unheralded innovations of a handful of states. 
Next, I tried to identify all states that have ever employed consequentialist 
criteria in the modern era, as well as the years of the elections in which the criteria 
were used. In some cases, this task was relatively straightforward. For example, the 
state laws of Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, and Washington currently include 
partisan fairness or competitiveness requirements, and it was not hard to 
determine when these requirements were enacted.42 In many cases, however, 
consequentialist criteria were not memorialized in state laws, but rather were 
invoked on an ad hoc basis by legislatures, commissions, or courts. I found these 
cases by searching the relevant case law, examining state redistricting websites, and 
consulting historical resources on redistricting. I cannot be certain that I have 
located all cases in which consequentialist criteria were used, but I am reasonably 
confident that I have discovered the vast majority of them. Notably, the National 
Conference of State Legislatures, the best-informed organization about 
redistricting around the country, could not identify any cases that I have missed.43 
Figures 1 and 2 list the states (and institutions within them) that have 
employed consequentialist criteria, the levels and years of the elections in which 
they did so, and the key language that they have issued. Consequentialist criteria 
have been used for about twice as many state legislative elections as congressional 
elections. They have been used about twice as often in the last two full 
redistricting cycles (the 1990s and 2000s) as in the two before them (the 1970s and 
1980s). And they have been used about twice as often by courts as by legislatures 
and commissions put together. The most common partisan fairness formulations 
include assertions that the concept was considered in drawing districts, bans on 
 
election results, I relied entirely on a comprehensive database that Carl Klarner has recently 
assembled. The congressional data includes the results of the 2012 elections, while the state legislative 
data is only available through 2010. Presidential election results aggregated by state legislative district 
are not available. 
41. See Leroy Hardy et al., Introduction to REAPPORTIONMENT POLITICS: THE HISTORY OF 
REDISTRICTING IN THE 50 STATES 17, 19 (Leroy Hardy et al. eds., 1981) (“By 1966, legislatures in 46 
of the 50 states had brought their apportionments into compliance with the new judicial standards of 
population equality.”). 
42. See infra notes 48, 49, 60, 67. 
43. Importantly, I do not include in my study provisions that bar district plans from being 
drawn with the intent to help or harm a party or candidate. California, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Washington use such provisions, but they are not consequentialist 
since they do not aim to produce election results that are fair to the major parties. It is also possible 
that redistricting authorities have employed consequentialist criteria without ever stating in writing 
that they did so. I doubt there are many such cases but I cannot be sure. Lastly, the fact that many 
consequentialist criteria have been used without being formally memorialized actually improves the 
accuracy of my empirical analysis. It means that the criteria were not adopted as components of 
broader electoral reforms, thus allaying concerns about endogeneity and omitted variables. 
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plans that unduly favor a party, requirements of approximate seat-to-vote 
proportionality, and requirements that whichever party wins a majority of votes 
also should win a majority of seats. The most common competitiveness 
formulations either state that the concept was taken into account or declare that 
larger numbers of competitive districts were created. 
 
Figure 1: Jurisdictions Using Partisan Fairness Criteria 
 
Jurisdiction Level Elections Used Institution Key Language 
South 
Australia44 
State 1993–2010 Legislature “[I]f candidates of a particular 
group attract more than 50 per cent 
of the popular vote . . . they will be 
elected in sufficient numbers to 
enable a government to be 
formed”
California45 Federal 
& state 
1974–1980 Court Plans are not “politically unfair” 
and will not “produce a manifestly 
unfair political result” 
Colorado46 Federal 2002–2010 Court “Finally, we check our plan against 
the test of general partisan 
outcome”
Connecticut47 State 1972–1980 Legislature “[W]hichever party carried the 
state should carry a majority of . . . 
seats proportional to the statewide 
party majority”
Delaware48 State 1972–2012 Legislature Plans shall “[n]ot be created so as 
to unduly favor any . . . political 
party”
Hawaii49 Federal 
& state 
1972–2012 Legislature “No district shall be so drawn as to 
unduly favor a . . . political faction” 
Illinois50 Federal 1992–2000 Court Plan is “likely to yield a distribution 
of seats across party lines that 
mirrors the statewide partisan 
makeup of the voting citizenry” 
Maine51 Federal 
& state 
1994–2000 Court Plan “attempted to remove some 
of the partisanship that had 
inadvertently been incorporated in 
our preliminary plan” 
 
44. Constitution Act 1934 (SA) pt 5 div 2 s 83 (Austl.). 
45. Legislature v. Reinecke, 516 P.2d 6, 38 (Cal. 1973). 
46. Avalos v. Davidson, No. 01 CV 2897, 2002 WL 1895406, at *8 (D. Colo. Jan. 25, 2002). 
47. Cummings v. Meskill, 341 F. Supp. 139, 147 (D. Conn. 1972), rev’d, Gaffney v. Cummings, 
412 U.S. 735 (1973). 
48. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 804(4) (2002). 
49. HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 6(2); see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 25-2(b)(1) (2012). 
50. Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections, 777 F. Supp. 634, 659 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
51. In re 1993 Reapportionment, No. SJC-229, slip op. at 1 (Me. 1993). 
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Figure 1 (continued) 
 
Jurisdiction Level Elections Used Institution Key Language 
Michigan52 Federal 1992–2000 Court Plan is “likely to result in a 
congressional delegation . . . that is 
roughly proportionate to the 
relative strength of the political 
parties”
Mississippi53 Federal 1992–2000 Legislature “The redistricting plan should 
avoid a political gerrymander” 
New Jersey54 Federal 
& state 
1982–2012 Commission Plan “sought to achieve statewide 
partisan fairness so that the party 
that receives a majority of the total 
statewide vote in a legislative 
election will obtain a majority in 
the legislature”
New Mexico55 Federal 
& state 
2002–2012 Court Plan “avoid[ed], to the extent 
possible, partisan bias” 
New York56 Federal 1992–2000 Court Plan included “political fairness” as 
criterion
Texas57 Federal 2002 Court Plan is “likely to produce a 
congressional delegation roughly 
proportional to the party voting 
breakdown across the state” 
Virginia58 State 1992–2000 Legislature Plan included “political fairness” as 
criterion
Wisconsin59 State 1992–2000 Court Plan “creates the least perturbation 
in the political balance of the state” 
and is “least partisan” proposal 
  
 
52. Good v. Austin, 800 F. Supp. 557, 566 (E. & W.D. Mich. 1992). 
53. MISS. STANDING JOINT CONG. REDISTRICTING COMM., CRITERIA FOR CONG. 
REDISTRICTING 3 (1991). 
54. Robertson v. Bartels, 148 F. Supp. 2d 443, 459 (D.N.J. 2001); see also Brady v. N.J. 
Redistricting Comm’n, 622 A.2d 843, 855 (N.J. 1992); Gonzalez v. State Apportionment Comm’n, 53 
A.3d 1230, 1236 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012); DONALD E. STOKES, LEGISLATIVE 
REDISTRICTING BY THE NEW JERSEY PLAN 7–17 (1993). 
55. Maestas v. Hall, 274 P.3d 66, 79 (N.M. 2012); see also Court’s Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law Concerning State House of Representatives Redistricting at 10, Jepsen v. Vigil-
Giron, No. D0101-CV-2001-02177 (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Jan. 24, 2002), available at http://www. 
senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/redsum2000/NM_D0101-CV-2001-02177_01-24-
02.pdf; Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 5, Jepsen v. Vigil-Giron, No. D0101-CV-
2001-02177 (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Jan. 2, 2002), available at http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments 
/scr/redist/redsum2000/NM_D0101_CV_2001_02177_01-02-02.pdf. 
56. Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 102–04 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
57. Balderas v. Texas, No. 6:01CV158, 2001 WL 36403750, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2001). 
58. Jamerson v. Womack, 26 Va. Cir. 145, 145 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1991). 
59. Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 871 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (per curiam). 
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Figure 2: Jurisdictions Using Competitiveness Criteria 
 
Jurisdiction Level Elections Used Institution Key Language 
Arizona60 Federal 
& state 
2002–2012 Commission “To the extent practicable, 
competitive districts should be 
favored . . .”
California61 Federal 
& state 
1974–1980 Court Plan will “result in fewer ‘safe 
seats’ and more ‘competitive 
seats’”
Colorado62 Federal 
& state 
1992–2012 Commission 
& court 
Plan “considered 
competitiveness as an important 
factor”
Florida63 Federal 1992–2000 Court Plan “considered . . . party 
competitiveness”
New Jersey64 State 1982–2012 Commission Plan “ensur[ed] that some seats 
were competitive so that the 
composition of the Legislature 
would be responsive to shifts in 
votes from one party to the 
other”
New Mexico65 Federal 
& state 
2002–2010 Court Plan “promote[s] . . . political 
competition”
North 
Carolina66 
Federal 2012 Legislature Plan had as goal “to create more 
competitive Congressional 
districts”
 
 
60. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14)(F). 
61. Legislature v. Reinecke, 516 P.2d 6, 38 (Cal. 1973). 
62. Hall v. Moreno, 270 P.3d 961, 973 (Colo. 2012); see also Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d 
1303, 1307 (10th Cir. 1996); Avalos v. Davidson, No. 01CV2897, 2002 WL 1895406, at *7 (D. Colo. 
Jan. 25, 2002). 
63. DeGrandy v. Wetherell, 794 F. Supp. 1076, 1084–85 (N.D. Fla. 1992). 
64. Robertson v. Bartels, 148 F. Supp. 2d 443, 455 (D.N.J. 2001); see also Gonzalez v. State 
Apportionment Comm’n, 53 A.3d 1230, 1236 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012); STOKES, supra note 
54, at 7–17. 
65. Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Concerning State House of 
Representatives Redistricting at 10, Jepsen v. Vigil-Giron, No. D0101-CV-2001-02177 (N.M. 1st Jud. 
Dist. Jan. 24, 2002), available at http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/redsum 
2000/NM_D0101-CV-2001-02177_01-24-02.pdf; see also Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law at 5, Jepsen v. Vigil-Giron, No. D0101-CV-2001-02177 (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Jan. 2, 2002), 
available at http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/redsum2000/NM_D0101_CV 
_2001_02177_01-02-02.pdf. 
66. Bob Rucho & David Lewis, Joint Statement of Sen. Bob Rucho and Rep. David Lewis 
Regarding the Release of Rucho-Lewis Congress, NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY 2 (July 
19, 2011), http://www.ncleg.net/gis/download/referencedocs/2011/joint%20statement%20of 
%20senator%20bob%20rucho%20and%20representative%20david%20lewis_7_19_11.pdf. 
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Figure 2 (continued) 
 
Jurisdiction Level Elections Used Institution Key Language 
Washington67 Federal 
& state 
1992–2012 Commission “The commission shall exercise 
its powers to . . . encourage 
electoral competition” 
Wisconsin68 State 1984–1990 Legislature Plan gave “due consideration to 
the need for . . . competitive 
legislative districts”
 
After compiling all the relevant election results and identifying all the 
relevant cases, the next stage of my analysis was to calculate measures of partisan 
fairness and competitiveness for each jurisdiction in each election year. My first 
partisan fairness metric was partisan bias, that is, the divergence in the share of 
seats that each party would win given the same share of the statewide vote.69 For 
example, if Democrats would win 48% of a state’s seats with 50% of the state’s 
vote (in which case Republicans would win 52% of the seats), then a district plan 
would have a pro-Republican bias of 2%. As is customary, I calculated bias at the 
point at which each party receives 50% of the vote,70 and I relied on the uniform 
swing assumption.71 I also considered only the absolute value of bias because I 
was interested in the metric’s magnitude rather than its orientation. 
My second measure of partisan fairness was the efficiency differential, that is, the 
gap between the parties’ respective “wasted” votes.72 All of the votes for a party’s 
candidate are wasted if the candidate loses the election, while all of the votes 
above the threshold for victory are wasted if the candidate wins. The party with 
 
67. WASH. REV. CODE § 44.05.090(5) (2013). 
68. WIS. STAT. § 4.001(3) (repealed 2011). 
69. See Andrew Gelman & Gary King, A Unified Method of Evaluating Electoral Systems and 
Redistricting Plans, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 514, 536 (1994); Gelman & King, supra note 4, at 545;  
Grofman & King, supra note 4, at 8. 
70. See Janet Campagna & Bernard Grofman, Party Control and Partisan Bias in 1980s 
Congressional Redistricting, 52 J. POL. 1242, 1245 (1990); Gary W. Cox & Jonathan N. Katz, The 
Reapportionment Revolution and Bias in U.S. Congressional Elections, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 812, 820 (1999); 
Bruce E. Cain et al., Redistricting and Electoral Competitiveness in State Legislative Elections 2 (Apr. 
13, 2007) (unpublished paper) (on file with the UC Irvine Law Review). 
71. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. In addition, because certain states do not report 
vote tallies when candidates run unopposed, I calculated statewide vote shares for the parties by 
averaging all of their district-specific vote shares, not by using aggregate statewide vote tallies. 
However, the two methods of calculating statewide vote shares produce very similar results. 
72. See Eric McGhee, Measuring Partisan Bias in Single-Member District Electoral Systems 15–18 (Jan. 
2, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2195785 (introducing this measure 
but calling it “relative wasted votes”). Because of the occasional inaccuracy (or unavailability) of 
district-specific vote tallies, see supra text accompanying note 71, I calculated the efficiency differential 
using district-specific vote shares, which are more reliable. Both methods again produce very similar 
results. 
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fewer wasted votes in a state is said to have an efficiency advantage over its 
opponent. Unlike partisan bias, the efficiency differential is calculated using 
unadjusted election results rather than the results of a hypothetical fifty-fifty 
election. For this reason, the metric does not require use of the uniform swing 
assumption—there are no vote tallies that need to be swung.73 As with partisan 
bias, I considered only the absolute value of the efficiency differential. In 
combination, partisan bias and the efficiency differential accurately capture the 
partisan fairness of an election. The metrics are well suited to assessing the 
implications of partisan fairness criteria. 
My first measure of competitiveness was the average margin of victory in a 
jurisdiction, that is, the average difference in vote shares between the winning and 
losing candidates.74 Uncontested races, which are common at both the 
congressional and state legislative levels, have a margin of victory of 100%. My 
second metric was the share of competitive seats in a state, that is, the proportion of 
races decided by less than a twenty-point margin.75 Narrower competitive bands 
(such as ten points) are sometimes used instead,76 but given the general lack of 
competitiveness in American elections, they are a bit too stringent for my 
purposes. 
My final metric was electoral responsiveness, that is, the rate at which a party 
gains or loses seats given changes in its statewide vote share.77 For instance, if 
Democrats would win ten percent more seats if they received five percent more of 
the statewide vote, then a plan would have a responsiveness of two. Like partisan 
bias, responsiveness relies on the uniform swing assumption and can be calculated 
either at the hypothetical fifty-fifty point or using an election’s actual results. I 
chose to compute it using actual results in order to make the resulting scores 
easier to interpret. In combination, average margin of victory and share of 
 
73. See McGhee, supra note 72, at 6, 22. 
74. See Forgette et al., Do Principles?, supra note 37, at 159; Norrander & Wendland, supra note 
36, at 184; Peter Miller & Bernard Grofman, Redistricting Commissions in the Western United States, U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 637, 662–63 (2013). 
75. See Thomas L. Brunell & Bernard Grofman, Evaluating the Impact of Redistricting on District 
Homogeneity, Political Competition, and Political Extremism in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1962 to 2006, in 
DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 117, 121 (Margaret Levi et al. eds., 2008); Jamie L. Carson 
& Michael H. Crespin, The Effect of State Redistricting Methods on Electoral Competition in United States House 
of Representatives Races, 4 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 455, 460 (2004); Richard G. Niemi et al., Competition in 
State Legislative Elections, 1992–2002, in THE MARKETPLACE OF DEMOCRACY: ELECTORAL 
COMPETITION AND AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 21, at 53, 65. 
76. See James B. Cottrill, The Effects of Non-Legislative Approaches to Redistricting on Competition in 
Congressional Elections, 44 POLITY 32, 36 (2012); Vladimir Kogan & Eric McGhee, Redistricting California: 
An Evaluation of the Citizens Commission Final Plans, 4 CAL. J. POL. & POL’Y 1, 16–17 (2012), available at 
http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/cjpp.2012.4.issue-1/1944-4370.1197/1944-4370.1197.xml?format 
=INT; Seth E. Masket et. al., The Gerrymanderers Are Coming! Legislative Redistricting Won’t Affect 
Competition or Polarization Much, No Matter Who Does It, 45 POL. SCI. & POL. 39, 41 (2012). 
77. See Gelman & King, supra note 4, at 542, 544; Grofman & King, supra note 4, at 9; 
McGhee, supra note 72, at 5. 
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competitive seats capture two important aspects of competitiveness, while 
electoral responsiveness is a direct measure of a crucial value that competition is 
meant to realize.78 In tandem, the three metrics are nicely tailored to evaluating the 
effects of competitiveness requirements. 
B. Partisan Fairness 
1. South Australia 
I begin my examination of consequentialist criteria with South Australia, 
which since 1991 has employed the most explicit and entrenched partisan fairness 
requirement in the world: “[I]f candidates of a particular group attract more than 
50 per cent of the popular vote . . . they will be elected in sufficient numbers to 
enable a government to be formed.”79 This requirement is ensconced in South 
Australia’s constitution, it is listed before all other criteria, it has been used to 
design five separate district plans, and it has been the subject of extensive research 
and analysis by the state’s redistricting commission.80 If any partisan fairness 
criterion could be expected to succeed, it is this one. 
As Figure 3 indicates, South Australia has enjoyed lower levels of partisan 
bias and smaller efficiency differentials than other Australian jurisdictions over the 
1990–2010 period. Its partisan bias averaged 3.6% in this era, compared to 4.5% 
for other state elections and 5.1% for federal elections. Its efficiency differential 
averaged 4.3%, compared to 5.5% for other state elections and 8.2% for federal 
elections. The Australian states included in my study all have substantial numbers 
of state and federal districts and rely on redistricting commissions that use almost 
exactly the same criteria.81 The existence of a partisan fairness requirement in 
South Australia is the most distinctive feature of this legal landscape—and, at first 
glance, it appears to have precisely its desired consequences. 
  
 
78. See supra note 22. 
79. Constitution Act 1934 (SA) pt 5 div 2 s 83 (Austl.). 
80. See supra note 18; see also S. AUSTL. ELECTORAL DISTS. BOUNDARIES COMM’N, REPORT 
6–16 (2007), available at http://www.ecsa.sa.gov.au/apps/uploadedFiles/news/416/Final_report_-
_1_Front_Section.pdf; S. AUSTL. ELECTORAL DISTS. BOUNDARIES COMM’N, REPORT 12–18 (2003), 
available at http://www.ecsa.sa.gov.au/apps/uploadedFiles/news/205/Report.pdf. 
81. See supra note 38 (specifying states used in analysis). 
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Figure 3: Australian Partisan Bias Scores and Efficiency Differentials, 1990–2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, the differences in partisan bias and the efficiency differential 
between South Australia and other Australian jurisdictions do not rise to the level 
of statistical significance.82 Nor, when I carry out regressions with controls added 
for the year, the level of the election (state or federal), the number of districts in a 
state, and the Australian Labor Party’s (ALP) share of the statewide vote, does the 
presence of a partisan fairness requirement remain a significant predictor of 
partisan bias or the efficiency differential.83 Interestingly, no variable seems to 
predict partisan bias with any particular accuracy, perhaps because its levels are 
uniformly low thanks to the use of independent redistricting commissions 
throughout Australia. However, the ALP’s statewide vote share is linked 
negatively to the efficiency differential, perhaps because ALP supporters are 
concentrated in urban areas, and so if the ALP’s vote share is low it is likely to 
receive particularly few seats (and to waste particularly many votes).84 Also of 
note, the presence of a partisan fairness requirement is statistically significant at 
 
82. A two-sample t-test for partisan bias yields t = 0.76 and p = 0.23. A two-sample t-test for 
the efficiency differential yields t = 1.12 and p = 0.13. 
83. See infra Table 1. All of the regressions that I ran for this Article used ordinary least 
squares. All of the regressions also used the election year (i.e., an election by a given state in a given 
year) as the basic unit of analysis. Since the presence of a partisan fairness requirement was not 
statistically significant even with these few controls included, I did not attempt to compile the full set 
of controls that I used for the U.S. models. In any case, redistricting criteria and the institutions 
responsible for redistricting do not vary appreciably from state to state in Australia. 
84. See supra note 16 (noting the tendency of single-member district plans to disadvantage 
leftist parties). 
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the more generous ten percent level, indicating that it is likely having some 
downward influence on the efficiency differential.85 
Longitudinal analysis further confirms that South Australia’s partisan fairness 
requirement has not been very impactful. For much of the postwar era, 
malapportionment and gerrymandering were rampant in the state; as Figure 4 
displays, bias averaged 9.0% over the ten elections between 1950 and 1975.86 In 
1975, the state embraced the one-person, one-vote rule and instituted an 
independent redistricting commission.87 Dramatic drops followed in both partisan 
bias (9.0% to 3.6%) and the efficiency differential (5.7% to 2.7%) over the next 
five elections. However, the 1991 adoption of the partisan fairness requirement 
did not produce any further benefits. Partisan bias remained static over the next 
five elections (3.6% to 3.6%), while the efficiency differential actually increased 
somewhat (2.7% to 4.3%). The upshot is that equally sized districts and an 
independent commission improved partisan fairness in South Australia, but an 
actual partisan fairness requirement did not. All of South Australia’s gains came 
after its first round of redistricting reform—but before its second. 
 
Figure 4: South Australian Partisan Bias Scores 
and Efficiency Differentials, 1950–2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
85. Its coefficient is substantial as well; the presence of a partisan fairness requirement reduces 
the efficiency differential by 5.6%. However, this result ceases to hold when fixed effects for the state 
and year are included in the model. 
86. Because I wanted the bias scores to reflect the impact of South Australia’s pre-1975 
malapportionment, I calculated statewide vote shares here using aggregate vote tallies, not by 
averaging the parties’ district-specific vote shares. For the same reason, I calculated the efficiency 
differentials using district-specific vote tallies, not vote shares. See supra notes 71–72 and 
accompanying text. 
87. See S. AUSTL. STATE ELECTORAL OFFICE, supra note 39, at 7. The first election conducted 
under the new regime was in 1977. 
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2. U.S. House of Representatives 
I turn next to the U.S. House of Representatives, where partisan fairness 
requirements have been employed by eleven states in sixty elections since 1966. 
The decisions to use these requirements typically have been made by courts that 
have found themselves responsible for drawing district lines. Legislatures and 
commissions rarely have opted to take partisan fairness into account.88 
As Figure 5’s density curves indicate, both partisan bias and the efficiency 
differential are lower in elections in which partisan fairness requirements are used. 
Partisan bias averages 6.2% in elections with these criteria but 8.3% in elections 
without them. Similarly, the efficiency differential averages 7.2% in elections with 
these criteria but 10.2% in elections without them. Both of these differences are 
statistically significant.89 The density curves also illustrate why partisan bias and the 
efficiency differential are lower in elections with partisan fairness requirements. In 
both cases, the right tail of the no-requirement distribution, containing elections 
with particularly high partisan bias and efficiency differential scores, is absent from 
the distribution of elections with the criteria. In other words, the presence of a 
partisan fairness requirement seems to prevent the adoption of district plans that 
are marked by extreme partisan biases or efficiency differentials. 
 
Figure 5: Density Curves for U.S. House Elections, Partisan Bias Scores  
and Efficiency Differentials, 1966–2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As with the initial South Australian results, these findings appear positive at 
first glance. Congressional elections with partisan fairness requirements indeed 
treat the major parties more symmetrically than congressional elections without 
them. Unfortunately, as with South Australia, the findings’ impressiveness 
decreases when the data is subjected to more rigorous analysis. I regressed partisan 
 
88. See supra Figure 1. 
89. A two-sample t-test for partisan bias yields t = 2.83 and p = 0.004 . A two-sample t-test for 
the efficiency differential yields t = 3.55 and p = 0.0005. I omit states with fewer than five 
congressional districts from my analysis because partisan fairness metrics are too unreliable when the 
number of districts is so small. 
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bias and the efficiency differential against the presence of a partisan fairness 
requirement as well as an array of controls that, according to the political science 
literature, may have an effect on partisan fairness: other redistricting criteria, the 
institution responsible for redistricting, Voting Rights Act (VRA) coverage, 
whether the state government was unified or divided, the Democratic share of the 
statewide vote, the number of districts in a state, the year of the election, and the 
redistricting cycle of the election.90 The presence of a partisan fairness 
requirement was statistically insignificant in the partisan bias model, and 
significant only at the more generous ten percent level in the efficiency differential 
model. The requirement’s presence therefore does not seem to be a major 
determinant of partisan fairness once other relevant factors have been taken into 
account.91 
Which factors are major determinants of partisan fairness? Interestingly, in 
the partisan bias model, no variable attained the customary five percent level of 
significance, suggesting that bias in congressional elections (like bias in Australian 
elections) is quite difficult to predict. However, the use of a court to design a 
district plan was significant at the ten percent level. Unsurprisingly, partisan 
gerrymanders are unlikely to emerge when judicial actors are responsible for 
redistricting.92 In the efficiency differential model, the number of districts in a 
state and the Democratic share of the statewide vote were both significant at the 
usual level, and the presence of divided government almost reached this threshold. 
A larger number of districts reduces the efficiency differential because it increases 
the denominator for the calculation and lowers the metric’s volatility. The 
Democratic vote share may be linked positively to the efficiency differential 
because when Democrats perform well in a state they are likely to waste many of 
their votes in dense urban areas.93 And the presence of divided government 
 
90. See infra Table 2. I only considered elections in the 1990, 2000, and 2010 cycles, because 
controls for earlier cycles were unavailable. Most of the controls vary by redistricting cycle, though the 
Democratic share of the statewide vote and the year of the election vary by year, and VRA coverage 
does not vary temporally at all. The reasons why the controls might be expected to have an effect on 
partisan fairness are discussed below in my analyses of the regression results. My results are similar 
when I use robust standard errors or cluster standard errors by state, for both these regressions and 
the ones discussed below. These models thus are not reported in the appendix. 
91. When fixed effects are added for the state and year, the presence of a partisan fairness 
requirement loses its statistical significance (at any level) in the efficiency differential model as well. 
92. When I further limited the universe of cases to states with at least ten congressional 
districts, several variables attained statistical significance in the partisan bias model. Respect for 
communities of interest and respect for prior district cores increased partisan bias, while incumbency 
protection, divided government, commission usage, and court usage reduced it. Similarly, in the 
efficiency differential model, respect for prior district cores and the Democratic share of the statewide 
vote increased the differential, while divided government and commission usage reduced it. These 
results are consistent with the findings of the state legislative models, which also use plans containing 
relatively large numbers of districts. See infra Table 3. 
93. It is unclear why the Democratic vote share is linked positively to the efficiency 
differential, while the ALP vote share in Australia is linked negatively. See supra note 84 and 
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inhibits partisan gerrymandering because both parties will almost never agree to a 
district plan that disadvantages one of them.94 
3. U.S. State Legislatures 
American state legislative elections are the final set of races that I examined 
for evidence of the effectiveness of partisan fairness requirements. Nine states 
have employed such requirements in 128 state house and state senate elections 
over the 1967–2010 period. Legislatures and courts each account for about half of 
these cases; the only state-level commission to take partisan fairness into account 
is New Jersey’s.95 For present purposes, the most notable difference between state 
legislative and congressional elections is the larger number of districts in the 
former. The average state legislative plan has sixty-six districts, compared to 
thirteen in the congressional plans that I used in my analysis (and nine in all 
congressional plans).96 The greater volume of state legislative districts makes 
measures of both partisan fairness and competitiveness substantially more 
trustworthy. 
As Figure 6’s density curves display, both partisan bias and the efficiency 
differential are lower in elections in which partisan fairness requirements are used. 
Partisan bias averages 5.9% in elections with these criteria but 6.7% in elections 
without them. Similarly, the efficiency differential averages 7.9% in elections with 
these criteria but 9.9% in elections without them. Both of these differences are 
statistically significant.97 These state legislative findings are very similar to the 
congressional results presented above, and so too are the shapes of the density 
curves. Once again, the right tails of the no-requirement distributions, containing 
elections with particularly high partisan bias and efficiency differential scores, are 
absent from the distributions of elections with the criteria. The effect is even more 
pronounced here because the left sides of the distributions are nearly identical. 
Partisan fairness requirements appear to alter the distributions of state legislative 
plans only by slicing off their right tails. 
 
  
 
accompanying text. Differences in the distributions of the leftist parties’ supporters presumably 
account for this result. 
94. In addition, the presence of a competitiveness requirement is significant at the ten percent 
level in both models, though it is hard to know what to make of this result since the requirement’s 
presence seems to increase partisan bias but reduce the efficiency differential. See infra Table 2. 
95. See supra Figure 1. 
96. I omit states with fewer than five congressional districts from my congressional regression 
analysis. See supra note 89; infra note 104. 
97. A two-sample t-test for partisan bias yields t = 1.88 and p = 0.031. A two-sample t-test for 
the efficiency differential yields t = 3.35 and p = 0.0005. I omit states with multimember districts from 
my analysis because partisan fairness metrics cannot easily be calculated for plans that use such 
districts. 
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Figure 6: Density Curves for U.S. State Legislative Elections,  
Partisan Bias Scores and Efficiency Differentials, 1967–2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unfortunately, as with the congressional results, this promising picture fades 
once controls are added for other relevant factors. Controlling for the same 
variables as before, the presence of a partisan fairness requirement is not a 
statistically significant predictor of either partisan bias or the efficiency 
differential.98 The encouraging descriptive statistics and density curves are 
therefore misleading. Partisan fairness requirements in fact do little to improve the 
partisan symmetry of state legislative elections. 
Some of the factors that do influence partisan symmetry in state legislative 
elections are familiar from the congressional analysis. Once again, the number of 
districts in a state and the use of a court to design a district plan have a significant 
downward impact on both measures of partisan fairness, while the Democratic 
share of the statewide vote has a significant upward impact. But, unlike in the 
congressional analysis, the use of a commission to draw district lines is now a 
significant predictor of the efficiency differential. As one might expect, there is 
less of an efficiency gap between the parties when an outside body is responsible 
for redistricting.99 Also notable are the effects of various common line-drawing 
criteria. Respect for political subdivisions is linked to higher partisan bias, likely 
because Democrats end up overconcentrated when the boundaries of urban areas 
are carefully followed.100 Compactness is linked to higher efficiency differentials, 
probably because aesthetically appealing districts also tend to pack Democrats.101 
And the protection of incumbents is linked to lower partisan bias, since when 
both parties’ elected officials are insulated from competition it is difficult to 
simultaneously enact a partisan gerrymander.102 
 
98. See infra Table 3. 
99. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 37, at 799–800 (summarizing literature finding that use of 
commissions increases partisan fairness). 
100. See supra note 16. 
101. See Chen & Rodden, supra note 16, at 2, 20. 
102. In addition, respect for prior district cores is linked to higher partisan bias, perhaps 
because the requirement tends to freeze in place existing partisan gerrymanders. And coverage by 
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C. Competitiveness 
1. U.S. House of Representatives 
Competitiveness requirements are the other kind of consequentialist criteria, 
and they have been employed at the congressional level by seven states in thirty-
eight elections. Courts are the institutions that most often have decided to impose 
these requirements, though they also have been applied by commissions and, on 
one occasion, a legislature. Most of the states that have used the requirements are 
located in the western part of the country.103 
Like partisan fairness criteria, competitiveness requirements appear at first to 
have produced their desired consequences. The average margin of victory is lower 
in elections with them than in elections without them (32.0% versus 40.1%); the 
proportion of races decided by less than twenty points is higher (37.6% versus 
28.2%); and the level of electoral responsiveness is higher as well (1.85 versus 
1.44). All of these differences are statistically significant, though only at the ten 
percent level in the case of responsiveness.104 The density curves displayed in 
Figure 7 are less illuminating than the ones shown earlier, due to the relatively 
small number of congressional elections with competitiveness requirements, but 
they also tend to confirm this rosy picture. The average-margin-of-victory curve 
for elections with the criteria is clearly to the left of the curve for elections without 
them, while the share-of-competitive-districts curve for elections with the criteria 
is clearly to the right of the curve for elections without them.105 
 
  
 
section 5 of the VRA is linked to lower efficiency differentials, either because the provision prevents 
optimal Republican gerrymanders from being enacted, see Adam B. Cox & Richard T. Holden, 
Reconsidering Racial and Partisan Gerrymandering, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 573–74 (2011), or because 
Democrats are more efficiently distributed in the southern states covered by section 5, see Chen & 
Rodden, supra note 16, at 30–31. 
103. See supra Figure 2. 
104. A two-sample t-test for average margin of victory yields t = 3.37 and p = 0.0009. A two-
sample t-test for the share of districts decided by less than twenty points yields t = -2.57 and p = 
0.0074. And a two-sample t-test for electoral responsiveness yields t = 1.50 and p = 0.071. As 
before, I omit states with fewer than five congressional districts from my analysis because 
competitiveness metrics are too unreliable when the number of districts is so small. See supra note 89. 
105. On the other hand, the contrasts between the two electoral responsiveness distributions 
are not readily apparent. This is unsurprising since the difference between the two distributions’ 
means is significant only at the more generous ten percent level. See supra note 104 and accompanying 
text. 
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Figure 7: Density Curves for U.S. House Elections, Average Margin of Victory, 
Share of Competitive Districts, and Electoral Responsiveness, 1966–2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unfortunately, like the partisan fairness findings discussed above, these 
results evaporate when controls are added for other factors that the political 
science literature suggests are relevant. I regressed all three competitiveness 
metrics against the presence of a competitiveness requirement as well as controls 
for other redistricting criteria, the institution responsible for redistricting, VRA 
coverage, whether the state government was unified or divided, the Democratic 
share of the statewide vote, the number of districts in a state, the year of the 
election, and the redistricting cycle of the election.106 In none of these models 
does the presence of a competitiveness requirement attain statistical significance at 
any level. In other words, efforts by line drawers to make congressional elections 
more competitive do not in fact result in meaningful improvements in 
competition. 
One factor that does have a meaningful impact on all three measures of 
competitiveness is the use of a commission to draw district lines. Commission-
drawn plans boast lower margins of victory, higher shares of competitive districts, 
and higher levels of responsiveness, presumably because their authors have no 
 
106. See infra Table 4. As before, I only considered elections in the 1990, 2000, and 2010 
cycles, because controls for earlier cycles were unavailable. See supra note 90. Unsurprisingly, the 
presence of a competitiveness requirement also fails to attain statistical significance when fixed effects 
are added for the state and year. 
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reason to prioritize the protection of incumbents.107 Respect for political 
subdivisions also has a pro-competitive effect in all three models, probably 
because challengers are better able to convey their messages to voters in districts 
that are congruent with towns or counties.108 On the other hand, VRA coverage 
increases the average margin of victory and decreases both the share of 
competitive districts and responsiveness. Both the majority-minority districts 
required by the VRA and the “bleached” districts adjacent to them are particularly 
safe for incumbents. The presence of a compactness requirement also reduces the 
share of competitive districts and responsiveness, perhaps because compact 
districts pack Democrats without producing the countervailing benefits of district-
subdivision congruence.109 
2. U.S. State Legislatures 
Finally, competitiveness requirements have been employed by seven states in 
sixty-five state legislative elections. Commissions are the institutions that most 
often have decided to impose these requirements, though they also have been 
applied by courts and, on one occasion, a legislature. Most of the states that have 
used the requirements are again located in the West.110 As noted earlier, state 
legislative plans usually have many more districts than congressional plans, a fact 
that makes calculations of both partisan fairness and competitiveness substantially 
more reliable for the former.111 
As with congressional elections, descriptive statistics tell quite a positive 
story about the impact of competitiveness requirements at the state legislative 
level. The average margin of victory is lower in elections with them than in 
elections without them (42.0% versus 50.7%); the proportion of races decided by 
less than twenty points is higher (34.8% versus 29.8%); and the level of electoral 
responsiveness is higher as well (1.93 versus 1.54). All of these differences are 
statistically significant.112 The density curves displayed in Figure 8 also are more 
 
107. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 37 (summarizing literature finding that commission usage 
increases responsiveness and has indeterminate effects on competitiveness). 
108. See id. at 824, 829–31 (summarizing literature consistent with this result). 
109. In addition, the Democratic share of the statewide vote is linked positively to the average 
margin of victory, though only at the ten percent level. This may be because when Democrats do 
particularly well in a state many of their votes are cast in very safe urban districts. See supra note 16. 
The 2000 cycle also seems to have been especially uncompetitive, as the dummy variable for this cycle 
was linked negatively to the share of competitive districts. Lastly, unlike with the partisan fairness 
models, the regression results lose their intelligibility when the universe of cases is further limited to 
states with at least ten congressional districts. See supra note 16 . This is because most states that have 
used competitiveness requirements have had fewer than ten districts. 
110. See supra Figure 2. 
111. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
112. A two-sample t-test for average margin of victory yields t = 5.86 and p = 0.0000. A two-
sample t-test for the share of districts decided by less than twenty points yields t = 3.49 and p = 
0.0004. And a two-sample t-test for electoral responsiveness yields t = 3.67 and p = 0.0002. As 
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striking than their congressional equivalents. It is now evident that the average-
margin-of-victory curve for elections with competitiveness criteria is to the left of 
the curve for elections without them; that the share-of-competitive-districts curve 
for elections with the criteria is to the right of the curve for elections without 
them; and that the responsiveness curve for elections with the criteria is also to the 
right of the curve for elections without them. In the last two plots, the use of 
competitiveness criteria seems to cleanly shift the entire distribution to the right, 
in the direction of greater competition. 
 
Figure 8: Density Curves for U.S. State Legislative Elections, Average Margin of 
Victory, Share of Competitive Districts, and Electoral Responsiveness, 1967–2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In all of the analysis to this point, the presence of a consequentialist criterion 
was statistically insignificant, or significant only at the ten percent level, when 
controls were added for other relevant factors. Here, however, the presence of a 
competitiveness requirement remains a significant predictor of the average margin 
of victory (at the ten percent level), the share of competitive districts, and the level 
of electoral responsiveness after I control for the usual array of variables. This is 
the only potential success for consequentialist criteria identified by this Article. In 
state legislative elections (but not in congressional elections), competitiveness 
criteria (but not partisan fairness criteria) may indeed result in their desired 
consequences. Controlling for other pertinent factors, they decrease the average 
 
before, I omit states with multimember districts from my analysis because competitiveness metrics 
cannot easily be calculated for plans that use such districts. See supra note 97. 
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margin of victory (by 4.0%) and increase the proportion of competitive districts 
(by 5.1%) as well as the level of responsiveness (by 0.40).113 
Several other factors also have significant effects on competitiveness. As in 
the congressional analysis, respect for political subdivisions has a pro-competitive 
impact in all three models, while VRA coverage has an anticompetitive influence 
in each case. The use of a court to draw district lines also increases 
competitiveness in every model. Like commissions, courts have no particular 
incentive to shield incumbents from electoral challenges. On the other hand, 
respect for prior district cores, incumbent protection requirements, and the 
presence of divided government all are linked to reduced competition. 
Incumbents tend to benefit when their districts are kept largely intact after a round 
of redistricting. They are even more heavily advantaged when their protection is 
made an explicit line-drawing criterion. And when government is divided, both 
parties are motivated to shelter their elected officials, thus suppressing 
competition, since they lack the ability to enact a partisan gerrymander.114 
III. IMPLICATIONS 
The empirical results reported above have important implications both for 
the partisan fairness and competitiveness approaches and for redistricting reform 
in general. It is to these implications that I turn in this Part. With respect to the 
two consequentialist approaches, the dominant theme of the analysis is their 
inability to produce their desired consequences. However, there are some grounds 
for optimism in the efficiency differential models and in the competitiveness 
models for state legislative elections. Consequentialist criteria may usually be 
ineffective because of their poor drafting, low prioritization, and need for 
unrealistically accurate electoral forecasting. But they do enjoy some success in 
reducing the efficiency differential (probably a better metric than partisan bias), 
and in increasing the competitiveness of state legislative elections (probably the 
domain best suited to consequentialist line drawing). 
With respect to redistricting reform generally, the clearest point to emerge is 
the strong performance of neutral institutions. In both South Australia and the 
 
113. See infra Table 5. These results persist when fixed effects are added for the year of the 
election, but they cease to hold when fixed effects are added for both the state and year. The results 
also hold when I use robust standard errors (at the five percent level for each metric), but they hold 
only for responsiveness when I cluster standard errors by state. See supra note 90 (discussing use of 
robust and clustered standard errors). 
114. In addition, as in the congressional analysis, the Democratic share of the statewide vote is 
linked to lower competitiveness. See supra note 109 . The number of districts in a state is also linked to 
lower competitiveness, perhaps because when districts are especially small in population it is difficult 
for them to be competitive. Consistent with findings that competition is decreasing in state legislative 
elections, the election year has an anticompetitive effect as well. See Niemi et al., supra note 75, at 64–
67. Lastly, respect for communities of interest is linked to higher electoral responsiveness, while 
compactness and partisan fairness requirements are linked to lower responsiveness. 
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United States, the use of independent commissions is linked to greater partisan 
fairness and greater competitiveness. The use of courts to draw district lines in the 
United States has similarly positive consequences. Accordingly, institutional 
change should be a higher priority for reformers than the adoption of 
consequentialist approaches. The second point conveyed by the data is the unclear 
efficacy (or worse) of many redistricting criteria. For example, compactness 
requirements reduce both partisan fairness and competitiveness; respect for 
communities of interest has almost no effect on any of the relevant metrics; and 
the pro-competitive impact of respect for political subdivisions must be balanced 
against the criterion’s link to lower partisan fairness. Institutional change thus 
should also be a higher-priority goal than the enactment of conventional line-
drawing requirements. 
A. Consequentialist Approaches 
The overarching conclusion of the empirical analysis was that, once other 
relevant factors have been taken into account, consequentialist criteria have not 
achieved their desired results. The differences in partisan bias and the efficiency 
differential between South Australia and other Australian jurisdictions were not 
statistically significant. Nor did South Australia experience any increases in 
partisan symmetry after adopting its partisan fairness requirement in 1991. In the 
United States, the presence of a partisan fairness criterion also did not have a 
significant impact on partisan bias or the efficiency differential after controls for 
other pertinent variables were added. In the regression models for congressional 
elections, competitiveness was unaffected as well by the presence of a 
competitiveness requirement.115 
What accounts for this unimpressive record? Why don’t consequentialist 
criteria seem to work? One answer is that they are often drafted so poorly that it is 
difficult to discern what their authors sought to accomplish or how they are meant 
to be enforced. For example, statutes in Delaware and Hawaii forbid district 
plans that “unduly favor” a political party.116 It is entirely unclear how partisan 
favoritism is supposed to be determined, let alone what level of favoritism is 
undue. Similarly, authorities in California, New York, and Virginia have taken 
“political fairness” into account in designing district plans, but without providing 
any definition of this exceedingly vague term.117 And statements that 
competitiveness was “considered,” as in Colorado, Florida, and Wisconsin, neither 
explain what kind of competition was examined, nor specify how serious the 
 
115. And even the limited successes of the efficiency differential models and the 
competitiveness models in state legislative elections disappeared after fixed effects were added for the 
state and year. See supra notes 85, 91, 98, 113. 
116. See supra notes 45–46. 
117. See supra notes 56, 58, 61. 
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consideration was.118 It is not too surprising that consequentialist criteria of such 
imprecision have been relatively ineffective. 
Another explanation for the weak record of consequentialist criteria is the 
low priority they often have been accorded relative to other requirements. For 
instance, courts in California, Colorado, Michigan, Texas, and Wisconsin designed 
district plans largely on the basis of non-consequentialist criteria, and then took 
partisan fairness into account only after provisional districts already had been 
drawn.119 As the Texas court commented in its discussion of its line-drawing 
methodology, “Finally, we checked our plan against the test of general partisan 
outcome.”120 Analogously, the relevant Arizona and Wisconsin laws both make 
clear that competitiveness is subordinate to other redistricting criteria. The 
Arizona constitution declares that “[t]o the extent practicable, competitive districts 
should be favored where to do so would create no significant detriment to the other goals,”121 
while the Wisconsin statute states that “[t]o the very limited extent that precise population 
equality is unattainable, [the district plans] . . . giv[e] due consideration to . . . 
competitive legislative districts.”122 Again, it is unsurprising that consequentialist 
criteria that have been granted such low priority have had such limited effects. 
A further reason why consequentialist criteria have not been very effective is 
that election results—and in particular how they translate into measures of 
partisan fairness and competitiveness—are quite difficult to forecast. In U.S. 
congressional elections, for example, the correlation between the Democratic 
share of the statewide vote in one election and the Democratic share in the 
previous election averaged 0.80 between 1968 and 2010. But the correlations for 
average margin of victory, share of competitive districts, responsiveness, and the 
efficiency differential averaged only 0.63, 0.42, 0.24, and 0.45, respectively, over 
the same period. These figures reveal a sufficiently high level of volatility that it is 
hard to see how even the best-written and most highly-prioritized consequentialist 
criteria could consistently achieve their desired results. Over the decade-long 
lifespan of a district plan, competitiveness and partisan fairness tend to vary widely 
and unpredictably, thus undoing even quite meticulous districting arrangements.123 
 
118. See supra notes 62, 63, 68. 
119. See Legislature of State of Cal. v. Reinecke, 516 P.2d 6, 38 (Cal. 1973); Avalos v. 
Davidson, No. 01 CV 2897, 2002 WL 1895406, at *7–8 (D. Colo. Jan. 25, 2002); Good v. Austin, 800 
F. Supp. 557, 566–67 (E. & W.D. Mich. 1992); Balderas v. Texas, No. 6:01CV158, 2001 WL 
36403750, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2001); Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 871 (W.D. 
Wis. 1992) (per curiam). 
120. Balderas, 2001 WL 36403750, at *3 (emphasis added). 
121. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14)(F) (emphasis added). 
122. WIS. STAT. § 4.001(3) (repealed 2011) (emphasis added). 
123. I did not include elections held under district plans that differed from those used in the 
previous elections (i.e., 1972, 1982, 1992, 2002, and 2012). I also did not include district plans with 
fewer than five districts. Partisan bias is the one metric that does seem to be quite predictable, with an 
average correlation of 0.86 from election to election. The equivalent correlations for state legislative 
elections are 0.81 for average margin of victory, 0.64 for share of competitive districts, 0.54 for 
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The difficulty of predicting election results is also why South Australia’s 
partisan fairness requirement has not functioned as well as might have been 
expected. As Jenni Newton-Farrelly has explained, the South Australian commis-
sion relies on past election results as well as the uniform swing assumption to 
design its district plans.124 This approach worked well for the four elections 
between 1993 and 2006, in which candidates associated with the party that won a 
majority of the statewide vote always won a majority of the statewide seats.125 
However, the commission’s efforts misfired dramatically in 2010, when the ALP 
received 48.4% of the statewide vote but 57.4% of the statewide seats, resulting in 
a partisan bias of 7.4% and an efficiency differential of 10.6%. What went wrong 
was that the ALP’s vote share did not swing uniformly across all districts. Instead, 
“[t]he ALP ran the most successful defensive marginal seats campaign seen in 
South Australia,” so that “the biggest swings occurred in safe Labor seats and in 
fairly safe Liberal seats,” while marginal Labor seats barely swung at all.126 Not 
even the world’s best partisan fairness requirement could succeed in the face of 
such clever campaign tactics and unequal resulting swings. 
A final possibility is that consequentialist criteria do work but the metrics I 
calculated were too unreliable or the analytical techniques I used were too crude to 
pick up their effects. I estimated partisan fairness and competitiveness using 
standard measures of the two concepts as well as data from actual legislative 
elections. It is plausible that more advanced metrics (e.g., partisan bias computed 
without reliance on the uniform swing assumption127) or other data (e.g., 
presidential election results aggregated by district128) would have led to different 
conclusions. Similarly, I sought to determine the effects of consequentialist criteria 
using conventional ordinary least squares regressions that included controls for 
 
responsiveness, 0.48 for partisan bias, and 0.51 for the efficiency differential. When I ran the various 
regression models using only elections held immediately after a round of redistricting, more of the 
variance was explained in each case, but the presence of consequentialist criteria was no more 
significant. Line drawers thus seem unable to increase partisan fairness or competitiveness even in 
elections that are held just months after their district plans have been completed. Cf. Gelman & King, 
supra note 4, at 548, 550 (finding that bias tends to be stickier over time than responsiveness in state 
legislative elections). 
124. See Newton-Farrelly, Gerry-Built, supra note 18, at 475–80 (discussing South Australian 
commission’s methodology). 
125. However, in 2002 a third-party member who was expected to support the Liberals 
actually voted for a Labor government, thus giving Labor control of the state parliament even though 
the party had received a minority of the statewide vote. See Newton-Farrelly, Wrong Winner, supra note 
18, at 3–4. 
126. Id. at 5; see also Newton-Farrelly, Blindfolds, supra note 18, at 3. 
127. See Gelman & King, supra note 4, at 521–23. However, “the uniform partisan swing 
assumption does hold approximately in a vast array of democratic elections in the U.S.” Grofman & 
King, supra note 4, at 11 (emphasis added). 
128. See supra note 40. However, the regressions I ran using this data at the congressional level 
were less illuminating, and presidential election results aggregated by district are unavailable at the state 
legislative level. 
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relevant variables. It is again plausible that the results would have been different 
had I used other analytical techniques (e.g., difference-in-differences analysis129) or 
additional controls (e.g., the geographic distribution of partisan support across a 
state130). However, my sense from experimenting with these and other approaches 
is that this Article’s null findings are quite robust. Though I cannot be sure, I 
would be surprised if better data or more sophisticated techniques would 
determine that consequential criteria actually are successful. 
A relative bright spot in this gloomy picture is the performance of partisan 
fairness requirements in the efficiency differential models. In two of the three sets 
of elections that I examined—Australian and U.S. congressional—the presence of 
a partisan fairness criterion was statistically significant at the ten percent level, 
even after controlling for other relevant factors.131 The requirement’s presence 
reduced the efficiency differential by 5.6% in Australian elections and by 2.6% in 
U.S. congressional elections.132 Too much should not be made of these results, 
since the requirement’s presence did not attain the standard five percent 
significance level. But it does seem that partisan fairness criteria are not entirely 
useless, and it is also unsurprising that these criteria would have a greater impact 
on the efficiency differential than on partisan bias. As discussed above, the 
efficiency differential is calculated using actual election results rather than the 
outcome of a hypothetical fifty-fifty election, and it takes into account wasted votes 
rather than gaps between the parties’ seats.133 According to its creator, Eric 
McGhee, these attributes make it a more sensitive measure of partisan fairness 
than bias134—and may explain why it responds to the presence of a partisan 
fairness requirement while bias does not. 
The more important exception to the poor record of consequentialist criteria 
is the performance of competitiveness requirements in state legislative elections. 
Controlling for other pertinent variables, the presence of a competitiveness 
requirement was linked to a statistically significant decrease in the average margin 
of victory (by 4.0%) as well as statistically significant increases in the share of 
competitive districts (by 5.1%) and the level of electoral responsiveness (by 
0.40).135 One explanation for this finding is that competitiveness may be easier to 
 
129. However, it is difficult to select appropriate jurisdictions and time periods for difference-
in-differences analysis, and my experiments with the technique did not yield any especially interesting 
results. 
130. However, there is no well-accepted method for measuring this distribution. Cf. 
Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 1936–41 (introducing technique for measuring spatial diversity of 
individual districts). 
131. See infra Tables 1–2. However, the requirement’s presence lost its statistical significance in 
both cases once fixed effects were added for the state and year. See supra notes 85, 91. 
132. See infra Tables 1–2. 
133. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text. 
134. See McGhee, supra note 72, at 23–25. 
135. See infra Table 5. However, the requirement’s presence also lost its statistical significance 
once fixed effects were added for the state and year. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
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forecast than partisan fairness. Measures of competitiveness are derived more 
directly from election results than are measures of partisan fairness, which require 
the consideration of vote-to-seat conversion as well.136 Predictable factors like 
incumbency also have a large influence on the competitiveness of individual 
districts. Perhaps for these reasons, the correlations from election to election in 
state legislative races were higher for all three competitiveness metrics I used than 
for either metric of partisan fairness.137 
The election level is the second potential explanation for the effectiveness of 
competitiveness requirements in state legislative races. As noted earlier, state 
legislative plans have many more districts than congressional plans, a fact that 
improves the reliability of electoral metrics that are calculated for the former.138 
This improved reliability explains why the state legislative models all were able to 
explain more of the variance in the dependent variables than the congressional 
models.139 It also explains why the metrics’ correlations from election to election 
were generally higher in state legislative races than in congressional races.140 
Beyond their larger numbers of districts, the stakes are lower in state legislative 
elections as well. Most state chambers are not closely divided between the parties, 
meaning that control of a chamber rarely hinges on the effectiveness of a partisan 
gerrymander.141 Even where control of a chamber does so hinge, it is only a single 
state house or state senate that is at stake—not the U.S. House of Representatives. 
It may therefore be easier for state legislative line drawers to prioritize 
consequentialist criteria than for their congressional counterparts. Lower stakes 
may be conducive to the achievement of goals other than partisan or bipartisan 
advantage.142 
In sum, the overall record of consequentialist criteria is poor, likely because 
of their shoddy drafting, low prioritization, and need for unrealistically accurate 
electoral forecasts. But there is a glimmer of hope in the ability of partisan fairness 
requirements to reduce the efficiency differential in two of the three sets of 
 
136. This is particularly the case for average margin of victory and the share of competitive 
districts. Like the partisan fairness metrics, responsiveness does require the consideration of vote-to-
seat conversion, through using actual election results rather than the outcome of a hypothetical fifty-
fifty election. See supra note 77. 
137. See supra note 123; see also Michael P. McDonald, Redistricting and Competitive Districts, in 
THE MARKETPLACE OF DEMOCRACY: ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND AMERICAN POLITICS, supra 
note 21, at 222, 238 (arguing, based on author’s own redistricting experience, that “it is possible to 
devise a working definition of a competitive district that will foster competitive elections”). 
138. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
139. See infra Tables 2–5. 
140. See supra note 123. 
141. Over the period from 1968 to 2010, the parties’ respective seat shares came within 
twenty points of each other in state legislative chambers only about forty percent of the time. In 
contrast, the parties’ respective seat shares in Congress were this close about eight percent of the time 
over the same period. 
142. See Cain et al., supra note 70, at 1 (“[R]edistricting [criteria] can be much more potent in 
the larger number of state legislative districts.”). 
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elections that I studied. This ability likely stems from the measure’s greater 
sensitivity relative to the more common partisan bias metric. And there is even 
more reason for optimism in the performance of competitiveness requirements in 
state legislative elections. Whether because competitiveness is easier to forecast 
than partisan fairness, or because state legislative elections are a more favorable 
setting than congressional elections, competition indeed is meaningfully more 
vigorous when district plans are designed using competitiveness criteria. 
B. Other Approaches 
The analysis presented in Part II sheds light on not only the performance of 
consequentialist approaches, but also the records of other popular proposals for 
redistricting reform. The most common such proposal (and one that I have 
defended in earlier work143) is the use of independent institutions, such as 
commissions, to enact district plans. The reasoning is that actors who are 
personally unaffected by redistricting should be able to draw better districts than 
self-interested politicians. Neutral plans should command greater popular 
legitimacy, they should better comply with whatever criteria apply to the line-
drawing process—and they should be fairer to the major parties and more 
competitive as well.144 
Consistent with these expectations, South Australia experienced dramatic 
improvements in both partisan fairness and competitiveness after adopting its 
independent commission in 1975. As noted earlier, partisan bias fell from 9.0% in 
1950–1975 to 3.6% in 1977–2010, while the efficiency differential fell from 5.7% 
to 3.5%.145 Similarly, the average margin of victory fell from 29.3% to 24.6%, the 
share of competitive districts rose from 33.1% to 42.7%, and the level of electoral 
responsiveness rose from 1.4 to 2.2. Some of this progress is likely due to South 
Australia’s simultaneous embrace of the one-person, one-vote rule, but some of it 
also must be attributed to the state’s institutional reforms. 
Another illuminating comparison is between all elections in Australia (where 
all states use commissions) and elections in the United States. With respect to 
partisan fairness, as Figure 9 indicates, partisan bias has averaged 4.6% in Australia 
and the efficiency differential has averaged 7.0%. The equivalent figures are 6.6% 
and 9.8% in U.S. state legislative elections, and 8.2% and 10.1% in U.S. 
congressional elections. With respect to competitiveness, as Figure 9 also displays, 
the average margin of victory has averaged 20.0% in Australia, the share of 
competitive districts has averaged 55.3%, and the level of electoral responsiveness 
has averaged 2.84. The equivalent figures are 50.4%, 30.0%, and 1.55 in U.S. state 
legislative elections, and 39.7%, 28.7%, and 1.46 in U.S. congressional elections. 
 
143. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 37, at 795–806. 
144. See id. (making these arguments). 
145. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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These are stark differences, especially for competitiveness, with Australia holding 
the advantage in every case. Australian and American elections both use single-
member districts, first-past-the-post voting, and the one-person, one-vote rule, 
and they both are dominated by two parties. The most glaring difference between 
the systems—the Australian embrace of redistricting commissions—thus likely 
accounts for a good deal of the Australian edge in partisan fairness and 
competitiveness. 
 
Figure 9: Partisan Fairness and Competitiveness Metrics  
for Australian and American Elections 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Further support for the efficacy of independent institutions comes from the 
various U.S.-specific regression models. With respect to partisan fairness, 
commission usage had a statistically significant downward impact on the efficiency 
differential in state legislative elections (by 2.1%). Similarly, reliance on a court to 
draw district lines lowered partisan bias (by 1.3%) and the efficiency differential 
(by 2.7%) in state legislative elections, and partisan bias in congressional elections 
too (by 2.0%).146 With respect to competitiveness, commission usage reduced the 
average margin of victory (by 8.9%) and increased the share of competitive 
districts (by 9.9%) and the level of electoral responsiveness (by 0.99) in 
congressional elections.147 Analogously, reliance on a court reduced the average 
margin of victory (by 9.1%) and increased the share of competitive districts (by 
6.7%) and the level of electoral responsiveness (by 0.45) in state legislative 
 
146. See infra Tables 2–3. 
147. See infra Table 4. 
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elections.148 The upshot is that in just about every model I considered, one of the 
key causes of appealing electoral outcomes was the use of a commission or court 
to draw district lines. 
To be sure, this Article’s results do not present an airtight case for 
independent institutions. It is unclear whether South Australia’s post-1975 gains 
should be attributed to its adoption of a commission or its espousal of the one-
person, one-vote rule. The Australian and American electoral systems differ not 
only in their reliance on commissions, but also in their use of mandatory voting 
(yes in Australia, no in America), their use of preferential voting (same), and their 
basic structure (parliamentary versus presidential). And the coefficients for 
commission and court usage in the U.S. regression models were often small, and 
there is no good explanation why these factors varied in their significance from 
model to model. But despite these caveats, the record of independent institutions 
is undeniably positive. To a much greater extent than consequentialist criteria, they 
actually produce improvements in both partisan fairness and competitiveness.149 
Reformers concerned about electoral outcomes, both in America and abroad, thus 
would be well advised to focus their energies on institutional change, not the 
adoption of outcome-oriented line-drawing requirements. 
The other common proposal for redistricting reform is the enactment of 
conventional criteria such as compactness, respect for political subdivisions, 
respect for communities of interest, and respect for prior district cores.150 The 
logic is that if redistricting authorities must abide by such requirements, they will 
be unable simultaneously to pursue partisan advantage or suppress competition. 
Reduced discretion will produce better election results. In addition, compliance 
with some of these criteria often is thought to have independent normative value. 
For instance, several scholars (myself included151) have argued that when districts 
are congruent with communities of interest, voters are more motivated to 
participate in politics, and elected officials are better able to represent their 
constituents. 
This Article does not contribute to the debate about the participatory or 
representational implications of conventional redistricting criteria. It does, 
however, offer several grounds for skepticism as to the ability of these criteria to 
improve partisan fairness and competitiveness by limiting line drawers’ discretion. 
In the various U.S.-specific regression models, the record of the criteria was mixed 
 
148. See infra Table 5. 
149. This Article’s findings are confirmed by the existing political science literature. See 
Stephanopoulos, supra note 37, at 799–802 (summarizing work on implications of commission usage 
for partisan bias, responsiveness, and competitiveness). 
150. I also include data on incumbency protection in my regression models, but it is a less 
common criterion and also one that clearly is not rooted in a desire to promote partisan fairness or 
competitiveness. 
151. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1379, 1390–97 (2012); Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 1941–48. 
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at best, and sometimes even counterproductive. Beginning with compactness, all 
of its statistically significant effects were in an undesirable direction. The presence 
of a compactness requirement increased the efficiency differential in state 
legislative elections, reduced the share of competitive districts and the level of 
electoral responsiveness in congressional elections, and reduced responsiveness in 
state legislative elections as well.152 Whatever the aesthetic benefits may be of 
compact districts, they apparently do not translate into electoral improvements. 
To the contrary, compact districts tend to pack Democrats and to result in unfair 
and uncompetitive district plans. 
The situation is more ambiguous with respect for political subdivisions. The 
requirement had a clear pro-competitive effect, reducing the average margin of 
victory and increasing the share of competitive districts and the level of electoral 
responsiveness in both congressional and state legislative elections.153 But the 
requirement also increased partisan bias in state legislative elections.154 These 
results arguably are reconcilable because adherence to subdivision boundaries may 
pack Democrats in certain districts (thus increasing partisan bias) while generally 
making it easier for challengers to convey their messages to voters (thus increasing 
competitiveness). But even if the results can be squared, they still present 
reformers with an unwelcome choice between partisan fairness and 
competitiveness. Gains cannot be made along both dimensions by mandating that 
districts coincide with political subdivisions. 
Next, respect for communities of interest seems to be a largely toothless 
requirement, at least in terms of its electoral consequences. The requirement had 
no meaningful impact on partisan fairness, and its only statistically significant 
effect in the competitiveness models was to increase responsiveness in state 
legislative elections.155 Earlier work of mine, using more sophisticated conceptions 
of district-community congruence, has produced more favorable results,156 but it 
does appear that the mere presence of a community-of-interest criterion is mostly 
ineffectual. Finally, respect for prior district cores, like compactness, has only 
adverse effects. The requirement increased partisan bias and the average margin of 
victory and decreased the share of competitive districts and the level of electoral 
responsiveness in state legislative elections.157 By freezing in place existing district 
 
152. See infra Tables 3–5. 
153. See infra Tables 4–5. 
154. See infra Table 3. 
155. See infra Tables 2–5. 
156. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 151, at 1459–62 (finding that community-of-interest 
requirement with three gradations had positive implications for partisan bias and electoral 
responsiveness in 2002 state legislative elections); Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 1963–66 (finding 
that spatial diversity, a proxy for district-community congruence, is linked in expected directions to 
bias and responsiveness). 
157. See infra Tables 3, 5. 
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plans, the requirement evidently advantages incumbents who have thrived under 
the status quo and prevents partisan imbalances from being corrected. 
Once again, these findings should be taken with a grain of salt. Like 
consequentialist criteria, conventional requirements are often poorly drafted and 
subordinate to other redistricting considerations. It is quite possible that they 
would perform better if they were written more clearly or prioritized more highly. 
Similarly, the presence of a requirement that districts be designed in a certain 
manner does not guarantee that they actually will be drawn in this way.158 District-
community congruence itself, for example, may have very different consequences 
than an ostensible rule that districts must respect communities of interest.159 Still, 
it is indisputable that the record of conventional redistricting criteria is mediocre 
at best. Reformers who hope to increase the partisan fairness and competitiveness 
of elections clearly should turn their attention elsewhere—above all to improving 
the institutions responsible for redistricting. 
CONCLUSION 
The emergence of the partisan fairness and competitiveness approaches is 
arguably the most important development of the last generation in the 
redistricting domain. But while much scholarly attention has been devoted to the 
approaches’ theoretical merits, almost none has yet been paid to a simpler (but 
perhaps more vital) question: How well do consequentialist criteria actually work? 
This Article has sought to answer this query by compiling a comprehensive list of 
jurisdictions that have used the criteria and then calculating measures of partisan 
fairness and competitiveness for a large set of Australian and American elections. 
Unfortunately for their proponents, the main finding of this analysis is that 
consequentialist criteria do not work very well. Controlling for other relevant 
variables, they typically do not make elections meaningfully fairer or more 
competitive. 
Two bright spots in this picture are that consequentialist criteria do increase 
fairness along one of the two metrics I used, and that they do increase 
competitiveness in U.S. state legislative elections. An optimist may therefore be 
forgiven for speculating that the criteria would perform even better if only they 
were drafted more precisely, prioritized more highly, or based on better election 
forecasts. A more robust finding, however, is that electoral outcomes actually can 
be improved by not taking electoral predictions directly into account. 
Consequentialist criteria themselves are largely ineffective, but the use of 
independent redistricting institutions, such as commissions and courts, is quite 
 
158. See Jason Barabas & Jennifer Jerit, Redistricting Principles and Racial Representation, 4 ST. POL. 
& POL’Y Q. 415, 428–29 (2004) (noting difficulty of assessing “the manner in which or even whether 
[redistricting criteria] were implemented”); Forgette et al., Un-Principled Politics, supra note 37, at 13. 
159. See supra note 156. 
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effective indeed. According to data from both Australia and America, 
commission- and court-drawn plans are substantially fairer and more competitive 
than plans devised by self-interested politicians. Ironically, it seems that 
consequentialist criteria cannot achieve their own desired consequences—but that 
non-consequentialist approaches can. 
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Appendix: 
 
Table 1: South Australia Partisan Fairness Models 
 
Variables Model 1: Partisan Bias 
(Absolute Value)
Model 2: Efficiency Differential 
(Absolute Value) 
Partisan fairness 
requirement 
 0.016 (0.021)   0.056 (0.033)* 
Year  0.00056 (0.00062) 0.00035 (0.00096) 
Level of election   0.0079 (0.022) 0.034 (0.034)
Number of districts  0.00021 (0.00035) 0.00089 (0.00054) 
ALP share of two-
party vote 
 0.036 (0.091)   0.47 (0.14)*** 
Constant   1.19 (1.24) 1.03 (1.93)
Observations 66 66
Adjusted R-squared 0.039 0.23
Note: Entries for variables take form: coefficient (standard error). 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table 2: U.S. House of Representatives Partisan Fairness Models 
 
Variables Model 1: Partisan Bias 
(Absolute Value) 
Model 2: Efficiency Differ-
ential (Absolute Value) 
Partisan fairness requirement 0.014 (0.015) 0.026 (0.015)* 
Compactness requirement 0.0028 (0.012) 0.0023 (0.011) 
Political subdivision 
preservation requirement 
  0.0048 (0.014)   0.0034 (0.014) 
Community of interest 
preservation requirement 
  0.0041 (0.016)   0.0045 (0.016) 
Respect for prior district core 
requirement 
  0.0089 (0.015)   0.020 (0.015) 
Incumbent protection 
requirement 
  0.0070 (0.018)   0.00089 (0.018) 
Competitiveness requirement 0.029 (0.016)* 0.030 (0.016)* 
Voting Rights Act coverage 0.011 (0.011) 0.0053 (0.011) 
Legislature responsible – 
divided government 
  0.014  (0.011)   0.021 (0.011)* 
Commission responsible 0.014 (0.014) 0.0057 (0.014) 
Court responsible 0.020 (0.011)* 0.0082 (0.011) 
Democratic share of two-party 
vote 
  0.0087  (0.040)   0.11 (0.040)*** 
Number of districts 0.00048 (0.00041) 0.0018 (0.00041)*** 
Year 0.00075 0.0014) 0.00028 (0.0014) 
2000 cycle 0.017 (0.016) 0.012 (0.016) 
2010 cycle 0.040 (0.026) 0.024 (0.026) 
Constant 1.59 (2.75) 0.64 (2.73) 
Observations 334 334
Adjusted R-squared 0.022 0.063 
Note: Entries for variables take form: coefficient (standard error). 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Legislature responsible – unified government is the omitted institutional variable. 1990 cycle is the 
omitted date variable. 
Only states with at least five congressional districts included.
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Table 3: U.S. State Legislative Partisan Fairness Models 
 
Variables Model 1: Partisan Bias  
(Absolute Value) 
Model 2: Efficiency Diff-
erential (Absolute Value) 
Partisan fairness requirement   0.00025 (0.0057)   0.013 (0.0084) 
Compactness requirement   0.0022 (0.0040)   0.012 (0.0058)** 
Political subdivision 
preservation requirement 
  0.015 (0.0044)***   0.0025 (0.0065) 
Community of interest 
preservation requirement 
  0.0060 (0.0041)   0.0013 (0.0060) 
Respect for prior district core 
requirement 
  0.022 (0.0081)***   0.0054 (0.012) 
Incumbent protection 
requirement 
  0.021 (0.0090)**   0.019 (0.013) 
Competitiveness requirement   0.0081 (0.0075)   0.015 (0.011) 
Voting Rights Act coverage   0.0025 (0.0049)   0.017 (0.0071)** 
Legislature responsible – 
divided government 
  0.0048 (0.0044)   0.0030 (0.0063) 
Commission responsible   0.0013 (0.0047)   0.021 (0.0068)*** 
Court responsible   0.013 (0.0053)**   0.027 (0.0077)*** 
Democratic share of two-
party vote 
  0.098 (0.015)***   0.18 (0.022)*** 
Number of districts   0.00026 (0.000034)***   0.00025 (0.000050)*** 
Year   0.00037 (0.00055)   0.00072 (0.00080) 
2000 cycle   0.00098 (0.0063)   0.0088 (0.0092) 
Constant   0.73 (1.10)   1.44 (1.60) 
Observations 802 802 
Adjusted R-squared 0.13 0.15 
Note: Entries for variables take form: coefficient (standard error). 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Legislature responsible – unified government is the omitted institutional variable. 1990 cycle is 
the omitted date variable. 
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Table 4: U.S. House of Representatives Competitiveness Models 
 
Variables Model 1: Average 
Margin of Victory 
Model 2: Share of 
Competitive Districts
Model 3: Electoral 
Responsiveness 
Competitiveness 
requirement 
  0.0021 (0.029)   0.040 (0.039)   0.067 (0.30) 
Compactness 
requirement 
 0.0093 (0.021)   0.079 (0.028)**   0.45 (0.22)** 
Political subdivision 
preservation 
requirement 
 0.11 (0.026)***   0.17 (0.035)**   0.76 (0.27)*** 
Community of 
interest preservation 
requirement 
  0.034 (0.029)   0.033 (0.039)   0.15 (0.30) 
Respect for prior 
district core 
requirement 
  0.032 (0.028)   0.059 (0.037)   0.37 (0.28) 
Incumbent 
protection 
requirement 
 0.047 (0.033)   0.0023 (0.044)   0.083 (0.33) 
Partisan fairness 
requirement 
 0.024 (0.028)   0.028 (0.037)   0.40 (0.28) 
Voting Rights Act 
coverage 
  0.12 (0.020)***   0.079 (0.026)**   0.33 (0.20)* 
Legislature 
responsible – divided 
government 
 0.0090 (0.021)   0.0085 (0.028)   0.033 (0.21) 
Commission 
responsible 
 0.089 (0.025)***   0.099 (0.034)**   0.99 (0.26)*** 
Court responsible  0.0039 (0.020)   0.0012 (0.027)   0.082 (0.21) 
Democratic share of 
two-party vote 
  0.14 (0.07)**   0.15 (0.098)   0.3 (0.76) 
Number of districts   0.00059 (0.00076)   0.00047 (0.0010)   0.0066 (0.0078) 
Year   0.00095 (0.0025)   0.0022 (0.0034)   0.026 (0.026) 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
Variables Model 1: Average 
Margin of Victory 
Model 2: Share of 
Competitive Districts
Model 3: Electoral 
Responsiveness 
2000 cycle   0.014 (0.029)   0.099 (0.039)**   0.096 (0.30) 
2010 cycle  0.026 (0.048)   0.093 (0.065)   0.035 (0.50) 
Constant  1.59 (5.05)   3.96 (6.76)   54.4 (51.9) 
Observations 334 334 334 
Adjusted R-squared 0.22 0.17 0.12 
Note: Entries for variables take form: coefficient (standard error). 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Legislature responsible – unified government is the omitted institutional variable. 1990 cycle is 
the omitted date variable. 
Only states with at least five congressional districts included.
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Table 5: U.S. State Legislative Competitiveness Models 
 
Variables Model 1: Average 
Margin of Victory 
Model 2: Share of 
Competitive Districts
Model 3: Electoral 
Responsiveness 
Competitiveness 
requirement 
 0.040 (0.021)*   0.051 (0.020)**   0.40 (0.14)*** 
Compactness 
requirement 
 0.012 (0.012)   0.011 (0.011)   0.12 (0.072)* 
Political subdivision 
preservation 
requirement 
 0.080 (0.013)***   0.063 (0.012)***   0.30 (0.081)*** 
Community of 
interest preservation 
requirement 
  0.0097 (0.012)   0.016 (0.011)   0.15 (0.074)** 
Respect for prior 
district core 
requirement 
  0.061 (0.023)***   0.053 (0.022)**   0.31 (0.15)** 
Incumbent 
protection 
requirement 
  0.11 (0.026)***   0.044 (0.024)*   0.19 (0.16) 
Partisan fairness 
requirement 
  0.0020 (0.017)   0.026 (0.016)*   0.20 (0.10)* 
Voting Rights Act 
coverage 
  0.10 (0.014)***   0.069 (0.013)***   0.40 (0.088)*** 
Legislature 
responsible – 
divided government 
  0.031 (0.013)**   0.025 (0.012)**   0.20 (0.079)** 
Commission 
responsible 
 0.012 (0.014)   0.0018 (0.013)   0.022 (0.085) 
Court responsible  0.091 (0.015)***   0.067 (0.014)***   0.45 (0.096)*** 
Democratic share of 
two-party vote 
  0.14 (0.042)***   0.093 (0.040)**   0.55 (0.27)** 
Number of districts 
  0.00058
 (0.000098)*** 
  0.0005
 (0.000092)*** 
  0.0029
 (0.00062)*** 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
Variables 
Model 1: Average 
Margin of Victory 
Model 2: Share of 
Competitive Districts 
Model 3: Electoral 
Responsiveness 
Year   0.0039 (0.0016)**   0.0035 (0.0015)**  0.026 (0.0099)*** 
2000 cycle  0.037 (0.018)**   0.031 (0.017)*   0.26 (0.11)** 
Constant  7.42 (3.15)**   7.27 (2.96)**   53.53 (19.86)*** 
Observations 802 802 802 
Adjusted R-squared 0.34 0.22 0.17 
Note: Entries for variables take form: coefficient (standard error). 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Legislature responsible – unified government is the omitted institutional variable. 1990 cycle is 
the omitted date variable. 
  
